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COMPREHENSIVE RULE TO APPORTION
TORT DAMAGES BASED ON
PROBABILITY
JOHN MAKDISIt
In many tort cases, acutal causation may be uncertain; under ex-
isting law a jury may find by a preponderance of the evidence that but
for causation was 'proved" when in fact it did not exist, or that but for
causation was not '"proved" when in fact it did exist. To remedy the
inefficiencies and injustices arising from this problem, Professor Makdisi
proposes in this Article that the tort system dispense with the element of
causation in fact and require instead probable causation. Furthermore,
as his analysis illustrates, when probable causation is proved, damages
should then be allocated in proportion to the probability of causation.
After explaining how this approach would better deter inefficiency and
promote corrective justice, Professor Makdisi examines misconceptions
about and abuses of the current system of proof by a preponderance of
the evidence. The Article then identifies steps that courts and other legal
scholars have already begun to take in the direction of probable causa-
tion. Finally, Professor Makdisi discusses the obstacles to determining
an accurate probability of causation and concludes that proportional ia-
bility based on probable causation would be very similar to the common
use of proportional liability found in other familiar areas of the law.
An essential element of a cause of action in tort traditionally has been cau-
sation "in fact" of the plaintiff's harm by the defendant's act or omission. This
element is generally defined as but for causation: "The defendant's conduct is a
cause of the event if the event would not have occurred but for that conduct;
conversely, the defendant's conduct is not a cause of the event, if the event
would have occurred without it."' While this element traditionally must be
proved to establish a cause of action in tort, it need not be proved with absolute
t Professor of Law and Associate Dean, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. B.A. Harvard
College; J.D. University of Pennsylvania; S.J.D. Harvard Law School. With thanks to my assistant,
Chris Hurlbut, for her research during the preliminary stages of this Article, and thanks to Profes-
sors David Forte, Lynne Henderson, Marjorie Kornhauser, Steven R. Smith, James G. Wilson, and
Julianna Zekan for their helpful comments.
1. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS 266 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]; see also Calabresi, Concerning
Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69, 72 (1975) ("any
one of many acts or activities without which a particular injury would not have occurred"). In
addition to the above-cited works, for a general discussion of causation rules, see H. HART & A.
HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 103-229 (1959); Borgo, Causal Paradigms in Tort Law, 8 J.
LEGAL STUD. 420 (1979); Landes & Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 12 J.
LEGAL STUD. 109 (1983); Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60 (1966);
Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the Law of Torts, 9 J. LEGAL STUD.
463, 466-68 (1980); Weinrib, A Step Forward in Factual Causation, 38 MOD. L. REV. 518 (1975);
Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1735 (1985) [hereinafter Wright, Causation]; and
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certainty. The law permits the jury (or judge sitting as factfinder) to find that
causation in fact exists even when its existence is uncertain, as long as it is
proved by a preponderance of the evidence. 2 For example, if the evidence shows
an 80% chance that defendant's negligent act caused plaintiff's harm, the law
permits the factfinder to find causation even though there is a 20% chance that
defendant's negligence did not cause plaintiff's harm.
This Article proposes that the tort system dispense with the element of cau-
sation in fact and require instead probable causation in fact. Furthermore, when
probable causation is proved, damages should be allocated in proportion to the
probability of causation. 3 Therefore, if the evidence shows an 80% chance that
Wright, Actual Causation vs. Probabilistic Linkage: The Bane of Economic Analysis, 14 J. LEGAL
STUD. 435 (1985).
One problem in using but for causation to define causation in fact is the case of duplicative
causation. For example, A and C start separate fires that are each sufficient to destroy B's house.
Although A and Care held liable in tort, a strict reading of the but for definition of causation would
relieve A and C from liability in this case. In order to include the duplicative causation case within
the scope of the but for definition, PROSSER & KEETON, supra, at 268, suggests a reasonable interpre-
tation of the but for rule: "When the conduct of two or more actors is so related to an event that
their combined conduct, viewed as a whole, is a but-for cause of the event, and application of the
but-for rule to them individually would absolve all of them, the conduct of each is a cause in fact of
the event." But see Wright, Causation, supra, at 1780-81 (objecting that the test "would treat totally
unrelated conditions as causes"). Implicit in PROSSER AND KEETON'S definition is the idea that
each actor by his conduct has satisfied all the elements for a tort beyond that of causation. An
alternative approach to the problem of duplicative causation is the substantial factor test. See infra
note 55. This author agrees with PROSSER & KEETON, supra, at 269, that the substantial factor test
is less desirable than their own interpretation of the but for definition.
2. The three prevailing standards of persuasion in litigation are proof by a preponderance of
the evidence (most civil cases), proof by clear and convincing evidence (some civil cases), and proof
beyond a reasonable doubt (criminal cases). MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 339 (E. Cleary 3d ed.
1984). Richard Posner defines the preponderance test as one which "directs the trier of facts to find
in favor of the party (usually, though not always the plantiff) who has the burden of proof if that
party's version of the disputed facts is more probably true than the other party's version." R. Pos-
NER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 520 (3d ed. 1986). And it has been stated that "[a] bare pre-
ponderance is sufficient, though the scales drop but a feather's weight." Livanovitch v. Livanovitch,
99 Vt. 327, 328, 131 A. 799, 800 (1926).
3. Several commentators have proposed proportional damages in limited contexts. See, e.g.,
F. HARPER, F. JAMES, JR., & 0. GRAY, 4 THE LAW OF TORTS § 20.2, at 102-03 n.25 (2d ed. 1986);
Cooter, Torts as the Union of Liberty and Efficiency: An Essay on Causation, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
523, 539 (1987); Delgado, Beyond SindelL" Relaxation of Cause-in-Fact Rules for Indeterminate
Plaintiffs, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 881, 892 (1982); Estep, Radiation Injuries and Statistics: The Need for
a New Approach to Injury Litigation, 59 MICH. L. REV. 259 (1960); Farber, Toxic Causation, 71
MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1221 (1987) (with modifications when the risk is not uniform across the class
of plaintiffs); Kaye, The Limits of the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard: Justifiably Naked
Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation, AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 487 (1982); Kelman, The Neces-
sary Mlyth of Objective Causation Judgments in Liberal Political Theory, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 579,
597-600 (1987); Landes & Posner, Tort Law as a Regulatory Regime for Catastrophic Personal Inju-
ries, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 417 (1984); Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 123-24; Page, On the Meaning
of the Preponderance Test in Judicial Regulation of Chemical Hazards, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
267 (1983); Rizzo & Arnold, Causal Apportionment in the Law of Torts: An Economic Theory, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 1399 (1980); Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the DES
Cases, 68 VA. L. REV. 713 (1982); Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A
"Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 851 (1984); Shavell, Uncertainty Over
Causation and the Determination of Civil Liability, 28 J.L. & ECoN. 587, 589 & n.8 (1985); Note,
Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof Standards of Persuasion, and Statistical Evidence, 96
YALE L.J. 376 (1986); Note, A Suggested Remedy for Toxic Injury: Class Actions, Epidemiology, and
Economic Efficiency, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 497 (1985) (hereinafter Toxic Injury]. On the use of
epidemiological evidence, see Dore, A Commentary on the Use of Epidemiological Evidence in Dem-
onstrating Cause-in-Fact, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 429 (1983); Hall & Silbergeld, Reappraising
Epidemiology: A Response to Mr. Dore, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 441 (1983); Novick, Use of Epide-
1989] PROPORTIONAL LIABILITY 1065
defendant's negligent act caused plaintiff's harm, probable causation would be
proved and damages would be awarded for 80% of plaintiff's harm. Likewise, if
the evidence indicates a 40% probability, damages would be awarded for 40% of
plaintiff's harm. This proposal treats what has been considered heretofore an
evidentiary concern as a factual concern. The factfinder traditionally has been
asked to determine by the weight of the evidence whether causation exists; under
this new rule it is asked to determine what the weight of the evidence is as to the
existence of causation. 4
No doubt this is a radical proposal, but it seeks to alleviate a radical injus-
tice. When causation is uncertain there is always a chance that but for causation
may be "proved" when in fact it does not exist, or that but for causation may not
be "proved" when in fact it does exist. Because proof does not require certainty
in many cases, it is unfair to provide remedial relief as if it did. Furthermore,
when the evidence shows a 51% chance of causation in one case and a 49%
chance of causation in another, it is unfair to give full relief to the plaintiff in the
former case and no relief in the latter. The two cases are practically the same.
The remedy that most accurately compensates the plaintiff for the conse-
quences of the defendant's act is one that includes a consideration of the
probability that the defendant's wrong has caused or not caused the harm and
miological Studies to Prove Legal Causation: Aspirin and Reye's Syndrome, A Case in Point, 22 TORT
& INS. L.J. 536 (1987); Comment, Epidemiologic Proof of Probability: Implementing the Propor-
tional Recovery Approach in Toxic Exposure Torts, 89 DICK. L. REv. 233 (1984). This Article ad-
vances the discussion one step further by advocating a comprehensive rule of proportional liability.
4. Probable causation describes the ex post probability of causation of harm given information
known after the harm has occurred. This term is not to be confused with the ex ante probability of
causation of harm given information known before the harm has occurred. For an example of the
latter use of this term, see Shavell, supra note 1, at 468-69, and Marks, Negligence, Causation and
Information, 31 MCGILL L.J. 128, at 135-37 (1985), using this term to describe the problem in Berry
v. Sugar Notch Borough, 191 Pa. 345, 43 A. 240 (1899). The ex ante probability of causation has
been described also as "causal link." See Calabresi, supra note 1, at 71-72.
This Article does not advocate the concept of damages for mere exposure to the risk of a harm
without actual harm occurring. This approach has been proposed by a few commentators. See, eg.,
W. LANDES & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 257, 263, 265-69 (1987)
(rewritten from Tort Law as a Regulatory Regime for Catastrophic Personal Injuries 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 417 (1984)); R. COOTER & T. ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMIcS 418-21 (1988); Robinson, supra
note 3; Rosenberg, supra note 3. See Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506, 516-22
(5th Cir. 1984) (rejecting a claim for mere exposure to harm), vacated in part and question certified
on reh g, 750 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc), certificate for question dismissed, 469 So. 2d 99
(Miss. 1985) (en banc), rev'd on second reh'g, 781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 478 U.S. 1022
(1986); Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1136-37 (5th Cir. 1985) (allowed a
claim for exposure to harm when it was included in a claim for actual harm), discussed in Note,
Damages for an Increased Risk of Developing Cancer Caused by Asbestos Exposure Are Only Recover-
able If It Is More Likely Than Not that Cancer Will Develop, 51 Mo. L. REV. 847 (1986) (approving
the Jackson approach). This approach is not advocated because it raises the problem of double
indemnity. If those who are exposed to the risk are entitled to recover, what may the plaintiff who
actually suffers the harm posed by the risk recover? The authors of W. LANDES & R. POSNER,
supra, at 268 n. 17, have chosen to "ignore the fact that some members of the class [suing for dam-
ages from the risk of harm] may decide to opt out and bring their own suit." Also, the expected cost
imposed by the risk is a harm while the risk exists, but this harm may pass and the victim restored to
a position of no expected cost. To be distinguished from this proposal advocating damages for expo-
sure to risk of future harm is this Article's proposal advocating damages for exposure to risk of past
harm. Harm has occurred and causation by defendant's wrongdoing is a probability. Cf. Farber,
supra note 3, at 1241, 1247 nn.98 & 118 (finding no functional difference between damages for
unrealized risks and damages after the risk has materialized but finding a problem with fairness if the
unrealized risk never materializes).
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that weighs the remedial relief accordingly. A 51% chance of causation is an
uncertain situation. It reflects doubt, and the court therefore should award less
relief for the plaintiff than if the causation were certain. More precisely, if the
expectation of causation of harm in the uncertain situation is 51%, the corre-
sponding expectation of relief should be 51% of the harm caused. This method
of valuing the chance of an event is based on the concept of "mathematical
expectation," otherwise known as "expected value." 5
The expected value of a situation is not an ephemeral concept. Although
the failure of defendant's negligent act to cause harm to the plaintiff may be
"negligence in the air,"6 the next section of this Article demonstrates that the
chance that defendant's act has caused harm is something different. It provides
a sufficiently substantial link between act and harm to require at least (but no
more than) partial liability. Liability in proportion to the chance of causation
deters inefficiency and promotes corrective justice.
Despite the justification for a proportional liability rule, however, the tort
system continues to favor an all-or-nothing rule of liability based on proof of
causation rather than on proof of the probability of causation. Section two of
this Article examines misconceptions about and abuses of the system of proof by
a preponderance of the evidence. Some courts have rejected the use of probabil-
istic evidence out of hand while others have permitted the use of probabilistic
evidence to prove too much. Although the proof of causation approach main-
tains the appearance of certainty, the result has been to place an unduly heavy
burden on the plaintiff with consequent injustice. To alleviate this strain, a few
courts have rejected the preponderance of the evidence standard in some cases.
They have developed a new standard of proof based on a substantial possibility
test. This new standard, however, does not solve the problem, and it produces
unfair results as well.
Only recently have courts begun to attack the problem at its source. Rather
than focussing on the standard of proof, they have begun to develop a propor-
tional liability rule that directly addresses the proper balance between plaintiff
and defendant. Section three of this Article discusses this development and
commentary by writers on the subject. Although several writers have com-
mended the steps toward proportional liability,7 no one yet has suggested adop-
tion of a comprehensive proportional liability rule in tort law.
Perhaps the failure to adopt a comprehensive rule is a result of some re-
5. The expected value of an uncertain event is the probability of the event multiplied by the
value of the event. See C. GOETZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND ECONOMICS 77-79 (1984).
If a coin is tossed in the air there is a 50% chance it will come up heads and a 50% chance it will
come up tails. If Bob were to offer Kate $100 before the coin toss if the coin came up heads, the
expected value of that offer is $50. Kate has a 50% chance of enjoying $100 coupled with a 50%
chance of receiving nothing. Likewise, a 60% chance that defendant's negligence caused a $10,000
harm is valued at $6,000 (.60 x $10,000), and a 40% probability generates an expected value of
$4,000. Although the coin toss is forward-looking and the negligent act is backward-looking, the
two situations are the same insofar as the result of the act is unknown except for its chance.
6. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 341, 162 N.E. 99, 99 (1928) (Justice Cardozo
quoting POLLOCK, TORTS 455 (11 th ed.)).
7. See supra note 3.
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maining obstacles in the proof of a probability. In many cases determining a
specific figure for the probability of causation may be difficult. Assume that the
factfinder believes that the probability of causation is between 60% and 80%. If
the harm caused was valued at $1000, the damages should probably be between
$600 and $800, but one figure must be chosen for liability. The problem of un-
certainty in the proof of a probability of causation is discussed in section four of
this Article.
This Article advocates an adjustment in the system of proof to accommo-
date a proportional liability rule linking degree of relief to degree of proof of
causation. This proposal is a new application of a familiar concept. In section
five a brief survey of the areas of joint causation, comparative negligence, and
damages illustrates the use of proportional liability as it already exists in other
areas of the law.
I. JUSTIFICATION FOR A PROPORTIONAL LIABILITY RULE
A. Deterrence of Inefficiency
Behavior is inefficient insofar as it results in a net loss to society. This loss
occurs when the costs of the behavior exceed the benefits. One of the goals of
our legal system is to discourage inefficient behavior by causing the decision-
maker to suffer (that is, internalize) the adverse consequences his behavior im-
poses on others. 8 When the decision-maker bears both the benefits and burdens
of his behavior, he will, one expects, behave in a way that maximizes his net
benefits and thus in an efficient manner. This goal of deterrence, accomplished
through imposition of the costs of inefficient behavior on the decision-maker,
underlies the rules for liability in negligence and strict liability.
The negligence standard, provided by Judge Learned Hand's classic
formula in United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,9 first decides what behavior is
inefficient and then imposes the costs of that behavior on the decision-maker.
There is negligence when the benefit (B) of the conduct is less than the
probability (P) of loss (L) from this conduct. 1° In algebraic terms, negligence
exists where B < P x L. (P x L) is the expected cost of the conduct.1 t When the
benefit of the conduct is less than its expected cost, the conduct is inefficient
because it produces a net loss for society. The expected cost of this inefficient
8. "In the utilitarian model the essential function of a tort system is efficient risk management
in order to reduce the net social costs of accidents, that is, the excess of accident-related costs over
activity-related benefits." Robinson, Probabilistic Causation and Compensation for Tortious Risk, 14
J. LEGAL STUD. 779, 783 (1985) (citing G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970); Brown,
Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1973); Posner, A Theory of Negli-
gence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972)).
9. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
10. "Loss" refers to actual cost. Every time an individual commits a negligent act, she is liable
only for the actual injury caused, not for negligence in the air. If no harm results, there is no
liability.
11. The benefit from the decision-maker's conduct also may be an expectation. In that case the
benefit side of the formula would also consist of a probability multiplied by the benefit expected.
One example of an expected benefit is the doctor who experiments with a new procedure that has a
certain probability of success.
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conduct is imposed on the decision-maker by subjecting him to damages every
time an injury is caused by his negligent conduct. 12 When the decision-maker is
forced to consider the expected cost along with the benefit of his conduct, he is
encouraged, by reason of the loss that he would suffer, to refrain from the negli-
gent conduct. Theoretically under the Hand formula, the rational individual
who would be subjected to damages if he were negligent will not act when B <
P x L. On the other hand, when B > P x L, the decision-maker's conduct is not
negligent and he is encouraged, by reason of the benefit he would enjoy, to en-
gage in the nonnegligent conduct.
Strict liability also generates efficient results. Strict liability does not decide
what behavior is inefficient. It imposes liability on the decision-maker for harm
caused, whether it is negligent or not. The decision-maker, however, is forced to
consider the expected cost of his conduct along with its benefit in a way that
produces the same results as in negligence. When the decision-maker would be
negligent (B < P x L), he is encouraged to refrain from the negligent conduct
because his costs would exceed his benefits. When he would not be negligent (B
> P x L), he is encouraged to engage in the conduct even though, contrary to
the case of negligence, he is forced to pay its costs. In the latter instance the
conduct produces a net benefit for the decision-maker because his expected cost
is still less than his benefit.
The following example illustrates the deterrent effect of negligence and
strict liability on inefficient behavior. Assume that a landlord is considering the
purchase of a $120 mat for a slippery common hallway and that the mat has a
life of one year. Without the mat, it is expected that people will fall six times
and injure themselves to the extent of $100 per fall over the lifetime of the mat.
Under these circumstances, either a negligence or strict liability rule would in-
duce the landlord to purchase the mat. If she does not buy the mat, the benefit
to the landlord is the $10 per month she will save from the cost of the mat, while
the expected cost is a 50% chance (P) of injury each month13 at a $100 cost (L).
The expected cost of $50 (50% of $100) per month exceeds the benefit of $10 per
month, and thus the landlord would be negligent not to buy the mat. Under a
negligence standard, knowing that she will be liable in damages for any injury
caused by her negligence, the landlord thus is encouraged to buy the mat.
Under a strict liability standard, the landlord would be held liable merely for
causing harm; however, the calculation and resulting deterrence of inefficiency
would be the same.
On the other hand, if the price of the mat is $720, B is greater than P x L
(60 > .5 x 100) and the landlord is not negligent if she fails to purchase the mat,
even if people fall and hurt themselves on the slippery floor.' 4 Under a negli-
gence standard, because the landlord is not forced to internalize the expected
12. An injury does not always occur from negligent acts, but the expected cost of each act, if
correctly calculated, is realized ultimately in the injuries that do occur from some of them.
13. There is a one in two chance of a fall each month if it is expected that people will fall six
times during the year.
14. This assumes that the $720 mat is the cheapest way to prevent falls on this floor.
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cost of accidents on his floor, she is not induced to buy the mat. Even if she
were forced to internalize the expected cost of accidents on his floor under a
standard of strict liability, the landlord would not be induced to buy the mat
because the expected cost of damages is less than the cost of the mat. The failure
to buy the mat in this case is efficient because the purchase of the mat would
involve a greater cost than benefit.
For another example, suppose a user of nuclear energy uses a process (Pro-
cess Y) that is $100/day cheaper than another process (Process Z) but also in-
creases the incidence of cancer in each employee from .004%/day (.00004/day)
to .006%/day (.00006/day). Assume that the cost to each employee who con-
tracts cancer is $100,000, that there are 100 employees, that the .00004/day
incidence is from nonnegligent causes, and that cancer contracted from Process
Y can be distinguished from all other cancer. Process Z does not cause cancer.
In this case the nuclear energy user knows he is negligent when he uses
Process Y because the expected cost (P x L) of cancer is greater than the benefit
from not using Process Z. That is, the benefit (B) to the user is $100, which is
the amount saved by not resorting to Process Z; the probability (P) of injury to
an employee from cancer caused by Process Y is .00002; and the loss (L) is
$10,000,000, which is the $100,000 cost of cancer to each employee multiplied
by 100 employees. Consequently, B < P x L because $100 < $200 (.00002 x
$10,000,000). In this case the nuclear energy user will be held liable for any
cancer caused by Process Y, whether under a negligence standard or a standard
of strict liability. Under negligence, liability follows negligence and causation,
and according to the Hand formula the use of process Y is negligent. Under
strict liability, liability follows causation.
Because damages would be imposed on the user if he used Process Y, he is
deterred from using it and encouraged to use Process Z. This result is efficient
because the conduct that is deterred would have produced a net loss for society.
Conversely, if Process Y is $300/day cheaper to use than Process Z, the nuclear
energy user is encouraged to use Process Y, whether under negligence with no
liability for damages or under strict liability with liability for damages that nev-
ertheless are less than benefits received. This result also would be efficient be-
cause the conduct that is encouraged produces a net gain for society.
The mat and cancer examples illustrate the deterrent effect of negligence
and strict liability. Negligent conduct should be deterred because it produces,
by definition, a net loss to society. To make the rule work under the present
system, however, there must be some way of proving causation when an injury is
caused by inefficient conduct. If causation is not provable, the deterrent effect of
negligence and strict liability is thwarted because damages cannot be imposed on
the party engaging in inefficient behavior and the expected cost of his conduct is
not internalized.
Proof of causation under the present system permits the factfinder to estab-
lish the fact of causation on the basis of evidence that it is more probable than
not. Once causation is established, full liability is imposed on the defendant. If
causation is not more probable than not, the plaintiff fails to carry the burden of
1989] 1069
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proof and no damages are awarded. This result is inefficient if the evidence sup-
ports a probability of causation other than 0% or 100%. A modified version of
the first cancer example described above demonstrates the need for a propor-
tional liability rule to obtain more efficient results.
The use of Process Y is negligent because B < P x L ($100 < 200).15
Assume that the cancer caused by Process Y cannot be differentiated from the
cancer caused by nonnegligent sources. Assume also that it is known that there
is a one-third chance that any cancer occurring in employees is caused by Pro-
cess Y. 16 Under the preponderance of the evidence standard, once cancer exists,
the inability to differentiate between the negligent and nonnegligent causes of the
cancer results in a failure of proof of causation. The most that the plaintiff can
prove after the fact of injury is a 33 1/3% chance that Process Y was the cause
of the cancer. But for causation is not established through proof of this chance,
and the defendant escapes liability under both negligence and strict liability
where his inefficient behavior has caused harm.17 With this result, the nuclear
energy user would be encouraged to choose Process Y over Process Z since he is
not required to pay for the cancer caused by Process Y. Under the preponder-
ance of the evidence standard, the expected cost of the negligent Process Y is not
internalized to the user's decision-making process, and thus he is not deterred
from using Process y. 18 This standard of proof is decidedly inefficient because
the failure to use Process Z produces an overall net loss for society.
Likewise, the standard of proof is inefficient when it causes defendant to be
liable beyond the harm caused by his own actions. Assume that Process Y is
$600/day cheaper to use than Process Z. Assume also that Process Y increases
the incidence of cancer (costing $100,000) in each of 100 employees from
15. Process Y is $100/day cheaper to use than Process Z but increases the incidence of cancer
(costing $100,000) in each of 100 employees from .00004/day to .00006/day.
16. The expost inquiry into whether the cancer was caused by the negligent Process Y involves
the 100% certainty that cancer exists as opposed to the .00006/day ex ante risk of cancer. The ex
post 33 1/3% probability of cancer refers to cancer caused by Process Y. This ex post causal state-
ment is probabilistic because of the lack of evidence to show whether the fact of causation by Process
Y did or did not occur. Kelman, supra note 3, at 591-93, 598-99 (stating that there is "something of
a tradition among devotees of ex post accounts of cause to deny that valid ex post causal statements
are themselves probabilistic"); see also Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal
Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1345-46 (1971) (asserting that probability concepts are relevant to
both future and past events). As Professor Ball stated:
If the future is uncertain, a great deal of the past is uncertain as well ....
[P]ropositions about past facts are "predictions," on existing information, as to what the
"truth" will turn out to be when and if more knowledge is available, and ... their
probabilities can cover the same range as the probabilities of statements about future
events. [footnote omitted]
Ball, The Moment of Truth: Probability Theory and Standards of Proof, 14 VAND. L. REV. 807, 815
(1961).
17. See Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 858 ("the excess risk caused by exposure to a toxic agent
frequently does not exceed the background risk; thus, a significant portion of plaintiffs will be unable
to prove that it is more probable than not that such exposure caused their disease"); Shavell, supra
note 3, at 588 & n.4 ("diminished burden of liability" when a party's probability of causation is
systematically less than one-half); Toxic Injury, supra note 3, at 515 ("Even if sufficient evidence
exists for the plaintiff to prove injury ... the high standard of causation defeats most actions").
18. See Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 879 ("the rule's undeniable effect is to shield some wrong-
doers from liability and force victims to bear their losses fully. Such a rule unjustly enriches the
wrongdoer and thus encourages the wrongs it fails to deter").
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.00004/day to .00009/day. The use of Process Y is not negligent because B > P
x L ($600 > $500 [.00005 x $10,000,000]). Assume also that the cancer caused
by Process Y cannot be differentiated from the cancer caused by other sources,
but that it is known that there is a five in nine chance that any cancer occurring
in employees is caused by Process Y. Under the preponderance of the evidence
standard, once cancer exists, it can be attributed to the defendant because there
is a greater than 50% chance that defendant was the cause. But for causation is
established and under strict liability, albeit not under negligence, defendant is
liable in every case of cancer, even when his act did not cause the harm. As a
result the nuclea energy user would be encouraged to choose Process Z over
Process Y. Process Z is $600 more costly than Process Y, but Process Y would
incur $900 in damages (.00009 x $10,000,000). Under the preponderance of the
evidence standard, the true expected cost of Process Y is not internalized to the
user's decision-making process because he is overcharged and thus overdeterred
from using it. The standard of proof is inefficient because it encourages the use
of Process Z and produces an overall net loss for society. 19
Proportional liability ensures the proper deterrent effect of negligence and
strict liability. If the cancer victims recover damages for their injuries in propor-
tion to the likelihood that the conduct of the defendant caused the injuries, the
nuclear energy user will be encouraged to use the more cost efficient process. In
the cancer example in which the user opted for Process Y, since the likelihood of
causation is one in three, each of the cancer victims among the employees would
receive damages under either negligence or strict liability in the amount of one
third of $100,000 ($33,333). Because the incidence of cancer for an employee is
.00006/day and there are 100 employees, the expected cost of damages for can-
cer is $200/day. The nuclear energy user now would be discouraged from using
Process Y. He would use the more efficient Process Z which costs $100/day
more to use but without the liability for damages from cancer.
In the cancer example in which the nuclear energy user opted for Process Z,
since the likelihood of causation is five in nine, damages under strict liability
using a proportional liability approach would be awarded to each of the cancer
victims among the employees in the amount of five-ninths of $100,000 ($55,556).
Because the incidence of cancer for an employee is .00009/day and there are 100
employees, the expected cost of damages for cancer is $500/day. With this re-
sult, the nuclear energy user would be encouraged to use the more efficient Pro-
cess Y; $500/day in damages is less than the $600/day increase in cost to use
Process Z. By internalizing both the benefits and costs of the situation through
19. See W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 4, at 262 (overdeterrence occurs from excessive
liability when the legal standard is strict liability as well as when negligence is erroneously defined).
The ultimate result from holding a defendant accountable for the results of background risk as well
as the risk from its own conduct may be to force it out of business. This phenomenon has been
referred to as "crushing liability." Shavell, supra note 1, at 465. Shavell does not propose in his
article to restrict the extent of liability in such a case because he believes administrative costs would
be high and the increment of losses caused by the injurer might often be difficult or impossible to
determine. Id. at 476 n.35, 499-500. He notes, "In any event, the alternative of restricting the extent
rather than the scope of liability has not in fact been adopted as a general solution to the particular
problem at hand." Id. at 476 n.35.
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the proportionality rule, the decision-maker again can make the best decision for
society.
Awarding damages in proportion to the likelihood of but for causation after
the fact reestablishes the deterrence function of the negligence and strict liability
rules. It provides a means for internalizing the expected cost of the decision-
maker's conduct to the decision-making process in the case of inefficient behav-
ior. This approach can be explained further by simply splitting probability (P)
into two parts: PC equals the probability after a cancer-related injury has oc-
curred that but for causation between the negligence and the injury exists; PL
equals the probability before a cancer-related injury has occurred that a cancer-
related injury will occur from any cause, whether from the decision-maker's
conduct or other causes. With these definitions, P in Hand's formula becomes
the product of PL and PC.20 In the example given above, PC is 1/3 (.00002/
.00006), and PL is .00006. PC (.00002/.00006) x PL (.00006) = P (.00002).
Hand's negligence formula, therefore, can be restated as B < PC x PL x L. The
right hand side of the formula is society's expected cost because there is a
probability of P that a loss of L will occur. Using this expanded formula, one
can see that this cost is the decision-maker's expected cost under the proportion-
ality approach because he will be charged with damages in the amount of PC x L
every time a cancer-related injury from any source takes place.2' Because there
is a probability of PL that such an injury will occur, the decision-maker has an
expected cost of PC x PL x L. Because the decision-maker's expected cost is
20. PL may be split further into P and (PL - P). If P is the probability before a cancer-related
injury has occurred that it will occur from negligence, then (PL - P) is the probability before a
cancer-related injury has occurred that it will occur from other non-negligent causes [(PL - P) + P
= PL]. Once a cancer-related injury has occurred, then the probability that it was caused by negli-
gence is P/PL. Thus, PC = P/PL, and P/PL x PL = P.
21. The idea of charging defendant for plaintiff's harm in proportion to the probability that the
harm was caused by the negligence (PC x L) is not new in toxic tort jurisprudence when the plaintiff
is one of a group that has actually experienced an increased incidence of harm due to the negligently
caused cancer. See Shavell, supra note 3, at 589 n.8, and Schwartz, Causation in Private Tort Law: A
Comment on Kelman, 63 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 639, 645 n.14 (1987), for examples in which a propor-
tional payment is suggested for each person who contracted cancer in such a group ((q-p)/q in
Schwartz's example is equal to PC as defined in this Article). See also Rosenberg, supra note 3, at
859 n.43. The proportionality rule, however, should not be confined to these cases, but rather ex-
tended to apply to a single plaintiff who has contracted cancer in a case where the ex post probability
of causation by negligence is known but actual harm by the defendant may not have occurred in fact.
Posner suggests that a defendant should be charged for a plaintiff's harm in proportion to "the
probability [that the harm] would have been averted by due care." R. POSNER, TORT LAW: CASES
AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS at 561 (1982). The probability that harm would have been averted by
due care is the probability that harm was caused by negligence. Posner, however, misstates the
formula for achieving this proportion when he charges the defendant with damages of (I - (PL -
P)) x L. (Posner's notation is changed to accord with the notation in this Article.) As an example he
gives the case of a loss (L) resulting from negligence equal to $100,000 and the ex ante probability of
loss if due care had been exercised equal to 40%. Posner concludes that "the proper measure of her
loss due to the defendant's negligence was $60,000 (60 percent x $100,000)." Id. at 561. This con-
clusion is true only if the ex ante probability of loss with negligence was 100%. Then P = 60%, PL
= 100%, and P/PL - 60%. But if the ex ante probability of loss with negligence had been 80%,
then P = 40%, PL = 80%, and P/PL = 50%. The proper measure of plaintiff's loss then would
be $50,000 (50 percent x $100,000). In this example Posner confused the ex ante probability of loss
caused by factors other than negligence (PL - P) with the ex post probability of loss caused by
factors other than negligence (1 - PC). In the following year, Posner used the latter probability




equal to society's expected cost, the decision-maker internalizes both the benefits
and the costs of the situation and thus is encouraged to decide on the more
efficient behavior.22
B. Corrective Justice
In addition to promoting efficiency, the proportional liability rule provides
a better scheme for fair compensation of the parties than the prevailing prepon-
derance of the evidence standard. Defendant's wrongdoing and plaintiff's injury
ordinarily must bear a cause and effect relationship in order to trigger liability.
Causation of harm23 and the existence of wrongdoing 24 justify the imposition of
liability, but more is needed. The causation of harm must be linked to the
wrongdoing - the question is how and with what effect.
In cases in which the link between causation of harm and wrongdoing is
uncertain, the plaintiff is overcompensated every time the probability of causa-
tion leads to proof of causation but causation in fact does not exist, and the
plaintiff is undercompensated every time the probability of causation does not
lead to proof of causation but causation in fact exists.25 Correspondingly, the
defendant may pay more (or less) in damages than the cost of the injury she has
caused by her conduct. While the proportional damages approach does not cure
this problem from the plaintiff's perspective, it does remove the problem of over-
or under-compensation from the defendant's perspective. Under the propor-
tional liability rule, the defendant tortfeasor pays for, and only for, the harm it is
expected she has caused. Over time, if the defendant were to engage in repeated
instances of her conduct, she would actually cause the harm she is paying for,
even though the victims of her injury-causing conduct share the damages for
their harm with others who have not suffered from her conduct.
26
Consider the case in which a negligent act is committed and a hundred
injuries occur in conjunction with this act. It is uncertain if the act has caused
any one of these injuries, but the probability of causation of each injury by the
negligent act is found to be 50%. The factfinder is saying in effect that in fifty
out of the hundred situations, it expects that the negligent conduct actually
caused the injury, while in the other fifty situations the negligent conduct did not
cause it. If relief is denied in each situation for failure to prove causation, the
tortfeasor escapes liability for harm that she is believed to have caused in fifty of
22. See Cooter, supra note 3, at 539 ("the polluters will face incentives for efficient precaution
so long as they are liable for the expected harm (the increased probability of cancer caused by the
pollution multiplied by the harm suffered by a cancer victim) they cause"); Rosenberg, supra note 3,
at 866 ("Under a proportionality rule, the expected liability confronting firms equals the losses at-
tributable to their tortious conduct.").
23. Cf. L THoMsON, RIGHTS, RESTITUTION, AND RISK 192 (1986) (a discussion questioning
the need for causation).
24. Cf. Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 407 (1987) (a discussion
questioning the need for wrongdoing, criticized in Colemhn, Property, Wrongfulness and the Duty to
Compensate, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 451 (1987)).
25. See Delgado, supra note 3, at 892-93; Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 862-63.
26. See Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 866 ("Under a proportionality rule, the expected liability
confronting firms equals the losses attributable to their tortious conduct.").
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the situations. She is undercharged and the plaintiffs who are injured by her tort
are undercompensated. If the proportional liability rule is applied, the plaintiff
in each of the hundred situations receives compensation in the amount of 50%
of the harm suffered, and the total amount of damages awarded equals the total
amount of harm suffered. While it is true that some plaintiffs receive less than
the full amount they deserve and others receive a windfall in damages for inju-
ries not caused by the defendant's tortious conduct, at least the award of partial
damages in each case under the proportional liability rule charges the defendant
with the full amount of the damages that she has caused and would have had to
pay if causation had been proved with certainty.2 7
This example is worth elaborating with some actual figures. If the harm in
each of one hundred situations is valued at $1,000 and in fifty of these situations
it can be proved with certainty that the defendant's tortious conduct caused the
harm, the defendant is required to pay $50,000 in damages. On the other hand,
if it can only be proved that the probability of causation in each situation is 50%
and each plaintiff is awarded $500 (P = .5, L = $1,000, therefore P x L =
$500) damages would also total $50,000. In both situations, the defendant pays
only for the harm she has caused. The only difference is that in the uncertain
situation those injured by her conduct share their damages with those who are
not. Neither the plaintiffs nor the defendant can complain. The plaintiffs actu-
ally deserving compensation receive at least partial damages, which is preferable
to receiving nothing.28 The undeserving plaintiffs clearly cannot complain about
receiving a windfall. Finally, the defendant cannot complain because the total
payment is equal to the actual harm caused.
As a variation of this example, consider the situation where the probability
of causation is 60%. If the defendant is required to compensate each of the
injured plaintiffs in full although in 40% of the instances she has not caused the
harm, she must pay $100,000 in damages when she has caused only $60,000
worth of injury. The defendant is overcharged and 40% of the plaintiffs are
overcompensated. Under the proportional liability rule, if the defendant is
charged only $600 (.60 x 1,000) in each situation, rather than $1,000, she pays
damages to the extent of the harm she has caused. While it is true that those
who are actually injured by the tortious conduct do not receive their compensa-
tion in full and the others receive compensation to which they are not entitled
under traditional tort theory, a fairer distribution of the damages is not possible
given the uncertainty of causation. 29
27. See Delgado, supra note 3, at 892-94.
28. See In re Agent Orange, 597 F. Supp. 740, 838 (E.D.N.Y 1984) (discussed infra text accom-
panying notes 101-08). In the settlement opinion, Judge Weinstein proposed the proportionality
solution to the causation problem in litigated mass exposure cases. He noted that "[w]hile any
plaintiff might feel that his or her recovery denigrated the degree of harm, the alternative of receiving
nothing is far worse.'" Id.
29. See Note, Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. Rcv. 1458, 1622
(1986). It has been argued that the preponderance of the evidence rule (or more accurately, a "maxi-
mum likelihood" rule) minimizes the total cost of errors in a set of cases as opposed to equalizing
them under a proportional liability rule. Kaye, supra note 3, at 496-508. This argument presumes
that error cost minimization is more important than error cost equalization, a proposition that is not
self-evident. Furthermore, Kaye concedes in a case of stomach cancers that are work-related:
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A proportional liability rule is justified by its deterrence of inefficient behav-
ior and its promotion of a fairer scheme of compensation. Yet the tort system
continues to favor an all-or-nothing approach to liability based on proof of ac-
tual rather than probable causation. The persistence of this approach stems from
misconceptions about the nature of proof that are examined in the next
section. 30
II. MISCONCEPTIONS AND ABUSES UNDER THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE
EVIDENCE STANDARD
A. Nonuse of Probabilistic Evidence
In a recent article on judicial proof and the acceptability of verdicts,3 1
Charles Nesson argued that to "accept verdicts as the basis for the imposition of
legal sanctions, the public must understand verdicts as statements about litigated
events and not about evidence presented at trial."' 32 Furthermore, in order to
project verdicts as statements about litigated events, the criminal system "re-
quire[s] jurors to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt and thus apparently
call(s) upon jurors to convict only on the basis of a belief about what actually
happened."'33 According to Nesson the legal system will achieve the ends of
deterrence and acceptability only if juries believe in the events (or at least the
public perceives such belief by a jury34) and not merely in the probability of the
events.
In a criminal trial belief is required beyond a reasonable doubt. Even in
some civil cases the finder must be persuaded of the events by clear and convinc-
ing evidence. Both of these standards refer to a state of the jury's mind and
require belief in the events, not merely in the probability of the events. Proof by
a preponderance of the evidence in a civil case refers, however, only to the
weight of the evidence required to carry the burden of proof.35 The evidence
In the example here, the "unbiased" nature of the expected value rule is appealing. It
avoids overcharging the firm, and the increment in the error rate does not seem extrava-
gant at most values ofpl and p2. Where a single defendant faces the possibility of numer-
ous suits from similarly situated plaintiffs and the probability that this defendant is liable is
the same in each of these cases, the expected value rule seems superior to the p > 1/2 rule.
Id. at 502 (citation omitted). Kaye proceeds to state that the apparent bias of the preponderance
standard (p> 1/2 rule) is not a concern "[a]s long as the probabilities are distributed across cases and
parties in a systematic way." Id. Again, this proposition is not self-evident, nor is it supported in
Kaye's article by any specific evidence. In fact, Kaye points out that in cases like Sindell v. Abbott
Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980),
there is a bias under the maximum likelihood rule that justifies use of a proportional liability rule.
Id. at 509.
30. It has been argued also that proportional liability would likely result in increased litigation
and consequently higher administrative costs and that therefore, in the context of most torts, propor-
tional liability is undesirable. Shavell, supra note 3, at 604, 606-09. Yet higher administrative costs
may be necessary to promote greater justice.
31. Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98
HARV. L. REV. 1357 (1985).
32. Id. at 1357.
33. 1d. at 1364.
34. Id. at 1360-63.
35. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, at § 339; Ball, supra note 16, at 808.
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must be preponderant in the sense of weighing more heavily in favor of one side
than another. The standard of proof does not refer to the factfinder's state of
mind. It refers to a quality of the evidence, its weight, to determine which ver-
sion of the events is more likely to be true, and it suggests, contrary to Nesson's
position,36 that the factfinder does not have to believe that the events are true.3 7
If the evidence preponderates only slightly in favor of one of the parties, the
factfinder may believe in the probability of the events but not be convinced of
their truth. In such a case the factfinder is permitted under the present system
to find the events true, and the party wins on a likelihood despite the failure in
belief.
Nesson's position makes sense in the case of criminal trials. Although
events are rarely certain in a trial, it is possible to believe they are true with only
a minimal amount of uncertainty and to convict a person on the basis of that
belief. One's sense of justice is not offended. If an accused person were con-
victed not on the basis of a belief in guilt but merely on the basis of a belief in the
probability of guilt, one's sense of justice would be offended. In the case of most
civil trials the situation is different. Plaintiff and defendant stand more on a par
with each other than an accused person stands against the state. The idea of
letting twenty guilty people go free to protect one innocent person38 does not
pertain in civil trials. To obtain a judgment in a civil trial the plaintiff needs to
show merely that defendant's negligent act probably caused his harm, not that it
did cause his harm in the belief of the factfinder.
Some courts appear to disagree with this proposition by refusing to accept
probabilistic evidence to establish causation in certain cases. They seem to
adopt Nesson's position that belief in the event, not in the probability of the
event, satisfies the burden of proof. These cases have denigrated the role of
probabilistic evidence in civil trials, but a closer examination of these cases
reveals an alternative explanation that is consistent with the continued use of
probabilistic evidence in civil trials.
In Smith v. Rapid Transit 39 plaintiff was harmed by a negligently driven
bus on Main Street. She could not identify the bus beyond describing it as a
" 'great big, long, wide affair.' ",40 The department of public utilities had issued
a certificate of public convenience or necessity to defendant bus company for a
route including the place where the accident occurred. The only other bus line
in operation at that time did not have a route on Main Street. The jury in this
case possibly could have believed that the probability of causation was greater
36. Nesson advocates projecting civil verdicts as well as criminal verdicts as statements about
events. Nesson, supra note 31, at 1363.
37. See Gold, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof Standards of Persuasion, and Statisti-
cal Evidence, 96 YALE L.J. 376, 381 (1986); see also Ball, supra note 16, at 818-29 (indicating some
of the difficulties with this view). The controversy over whether juries decide or should decide on the
basis of "belief in the truth" is discussed in Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 872 n.92.
38. "I should indeed prefer twenty guilty men to escape death ... than one innocent to be
condemned unjustly." Sir John Fortescue, De Laudibus Legum Angliae, ch. 27 (ed. and trans. S.B.
Chrimes 1942).
39. 317 Mass. 469, 58 N.E.2d 754 (1945).
40. Id.
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than 50%; however, the court directed a verdict for defendant and on appeal the
Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that "[t]he ownership of the
bus was a matter of conjecture,"'41 because someone other than defendant could
have operated the bus. The court quoted Judge Lummus in Sargent v. Massa-
chusetts Accident Co.42 that it is:
not enough that mathematically the chances somewhat favor a propo-
sition to be proved; for example, the fact that colored automobiles
made in the current year outnumber black ones would not warrant a
finding that an undescribed automobile of the current year is colored
and not black, nor would the fact that only a minority of men, die of
cancer warrant a finding that a particular man did not die of can-
cer.... [A] proposition is proved by a preponderance of the evidence if
it is made to appear more likely or probable in the sense that actual
belief in its truth, derived from the evidence, exists in the mind or
minds of the tribunal notwithstanding any doubts that may still linger
there.
The evidence in Smith was probabilistic inasmuch as it presented a fact
(defendant bus company's sole franchise) that would have given the jury a basis
on which to calculate the mathematical chances that the fact to be proved (de-
fendant's causation of the injury) was true. Even though the mathematical
chances might have been found by a jury to be more likely than not, the court
refused to allow an inference of causation, because it concluded that the evi-
dence was insufficient to generate a belief in the fact itself.43
41. Id. at 470, 58 N.E.2d at 755.
42. 307 Mass. 246, 250, 29 N.E.2d 825, 827 (1940) (quoted in Smith, 317 Mass. at 470, 58
N.E.2d at 755).
43. See De Pass v. United States, 721 F.2d 203, 206-10 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., dissenting)
(discussing probalistic nature of all evidence and contending that plantiff should be allowed to re-
cover based on probalistic evidence); People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 325-26, 438 P.2d 33, 36-37,
66 Cal. Rptr. 497, 500-01 (1968) (reversing conviction in which prosecution relied on mathematics
professor to allege that defendant and alleged accomplice fit a description whose chance of being
duplicated was one in twelve million), discussed in MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 210,
and Tribe, supra note 16, at 1334-38, 1342 n.40, 1350, 1355; Birmingham and Dunham, An Eviden-
tiary Value Reading ofNaked Statistical Proofs, 31 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 797 (1987); Nesson, supra note
31, at 1378-82 (discussing Smith and unacceptability of verdicts based on probabilities).
It has been argued that Smith is an application of the "strong version" of the preponderance of
the evidence standard, requiring some particularistic proof of the causal connection. See Rosenberg,
supra note 3, at 857 ("some 'particularistic' proof of the causal connection is required"); Tribe, supra
note 16, at 1341 n.37 (discussing Smith and noting that the holding in Smith is "entirely sensible if
understood ... as insisting on the presentation of some non-statistical and 'individualized' proof of
identity"). Particularistic proof, however, is probabilistic, as illustrated in the following passage by
Saks and Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 LAW &
Soc'y REV. 123, 153 (1980-81):
Similarly mistaken are distinctions between certain kinds of identifications. Descrip-
tions which lead to a probability of correct classification of a person (e.g., "a completely
bald man with a wooden left leg, wearing a black patch over his right eye and bearing a six-
inch scar under his left, who flees from the scene of the crime in a chartreuse Thunderbird
with two dented fenders") are treated as different from the "particularistic" type where a
witness says, "Yes, that's the person." Some have argued that evidence that the above
description fits only one person in 64 million ought not to be used in the trial of a person
fitting that description, because it merely specifies the class to which he belongs and its size;
it does not identify him. The latter identification would be more welcome, because it sin-
gles out a unique individual. The identifying witness may be confident that the identifica-
tion is correct, but the fact finder ought to appreciate the inherently probabilistic nature of
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Probabilistic evidence was rejected in Smith but it has been permitted in
other cases. In Reynolds v. Texas & Pacific Railway Co.44 plaintiff, a corpulent
woman weighing two hundred fifty pounds, fell down steps that defendant rail-
way had negligently left unlighted. Although she may have made a misstep, the
court concluded that
where the negligence of the defendant greatly multiplies the chances of
accident to the plaintiff, and is of a character naturally leading to its
occurrence, the mere possibility that it might have happened without
the negligence is not sufficient to break the chain of cause and effect
between the negligence and the injury.4 5
The factor that distinguishes Smith from Reynolds may be the high degree
of probability of causation in the latter that may have been sufficient to convince
a jury that causation actually existed. Another case suggests, however, that this
is not the distinguishing factor. In Cooper v. Sisters of Charity a sixteen year old
boy was struck by a truck while riding a bicycle.4 6 The boy died after an emer-
gency room doctor diagnosed and treated him.47 The Ohio Supreme Court held
that probabilistic evidence was admissible in court to prove causation of the
boy's death by the negligence of the doctor, and liability could be imposed if the
probability of causation was greater than 50%.48 The thrust of the court's dis-
perception, storage, recall, and identification. Apparently, fact finders (like legal commen-
tators) fail to appreciate this point. They act as though the eyewitness identification is
highly accurate, when in reality it may be far more likely than once in 64 million to be in
error. Indeed, the probability of correct eyewitness identification has been found to be far
lower than commonly assumed.
Gold questions Rosenberg's argument, Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 870, that all evidence, even "par-
ticularistic," is probabilistic. Gold, supra note 37, at 384 n.42. Rosenberg states:
"Particularistic" evidence, however, is in fact no less probabilistic than is the statistical
evidence that courts purport to shun. All knowledge of past as well as future events is
probabilistic. Inevitably it rests on intuitive or more rigorously acquired impressions of the
frequency with which similar events have occurred in like circumstances. "Particularis-
tic" evidence offers nothing more than a basis for conclusions about a perceived balance of
probabilities.
Rosenberg, supra note 37, at 870. Gold states:
When we see someone slip on ice and fall, we infer that the ice caused the fall partly
because we know that people fall much more frequently when walking on ice than when
walking on dry sidewalks. Yet our high belief probability about the cause of this particular
pedestrian's fall depends crucially on individual observation as well. The fact that we see
the ice overwhelms any inference we might have drawn from a table listing the relative
frequencies of causes of falls. The power of particularistic proof to generate belief
probabilities regardless of known fact probabilities requires us to treat particularistic evi-
dence differently from group-based evidence, despite Rosenberg's argument.
Gold, supra note 37, at 384 n.42.
In response to Gold's argument one may argue that if statistics were available on the percentage
of falls caused by ice in similar situations, we would be drawing an inference from this information to
determine the cause of this particular pedestrian's fall. Although we do not have these statistics
given in this case, they exist implicitly from the factfinder's experience.
44. 37 La. Ann. 694 (1885), cited in PROSSER & KEaTON, supra note 1, § 41 at 270 n.54.
45. Id. at 698.
46. 27 Ohio St. 2d 242, 242-43, 272 N.E.2d 97, 98-99 (1971).
47. Id. at 243-44, 272 N.E.2d at 101-02.
48. See id. at 253-54, 272 N.E.2d at 103. In Cooper it was found that a greater than 50%
probability of causation did not exist. One of the experts at trial testified that "while there is practi-
cally a 100% mortality rate without surgery for patients with similar injuries as decedent's, 'there
certainly is a chance and I can't say exactly what-maybe some place around 50%-that [the boy]
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cussion was that but for causation may be established when the chances of cau-
sation are merely greater than 50%. The court in Cooper permitted the
introduction of probabilistic evidence for the purpose of proving causation even
though the probability of causation may have been no higher than in Smith in
which the court excluded such evidence. 4 9
A careful reading of Smith in contrast to Cooper reveals an important dis-
tinguishing factor that justifies the difference in treatment of probabilistic evi-
dence between each case. Although both cases contain uncertain evidence of
causation, in Smith the negligence of the defendant is also in doubt. In Cooper
the negligence of the defendant is undisputed. Smith involves a potentially inno-
cent defendant in a case of wrongdoing harm; Cooper involves a wrongdoing
defendant who is potentially innocent of causing harm. It is more offensive to
attribute to a potentially innocent defendant a wrongdoing harm that he may
not have caused than to attribute to a wrongdoing defendant a harm he may not
have caused.50 Smith and Cooper suggest that while probabilistic evidence is not
acceptable in the former type of case, it is acceptable to prove causation in civil
cases where the negligence of the defendant is established.
5 1
would survive with surgery.'" Id. at 247, 272 N.E.2d at 101. From this statement the court
concluded:
Dr. DeJong's opinion that, with surgical intervention, decedent's expectation of survival
was "Maybe . . .around 50%," in our judgment does not provide a basis from which
probability can reasonably be inferred. The use of the words, "maybe" and "around," does
not connote that there is probability; those words, in the context used, could mean either
more than 50%, or less than 50%. Probable is more than 50% of actual.
Id. at 253, 272 N.E.2d at 104. The specific holding of Cooper was:
In an action for wrongful death, where medical malpractice is alleged as the proximate
cause of death, and plaintiff's evidence indicates that a failure to diagnose the injury pre-
vented the patient from an opportunity to be operated on, which failure eliminated any
chance of the patient's survival, the issue of proximate cause can be submitted to a jury
only if there is sufficient evidence showing that with proper diagnosis, treatment and sur-
gery the patient probably would have survived.
Id. at 253-54, 272 N.E.2d at 104; accord Gooding v. University Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015,
1020 (Fla. 1984) (stating that Cooper reflects the majority rule). For a different result under similar
facts, see Thomas v. Corso, 265 Md. 84, 288 A.2d 379 (1972).
49. In Cooper the court permitted the introduction of probabilistic evidence (the doctor's ex-
pert testimony) to prove causation. Cooper, 27 Ohio St. 2d at 252-53, 272 N.E.2d at 104. Particular-
istic proof, as such, was not necessary. The use of medical opinions in cases of this sort cast doubt
on the "strong version" interpretation of the preponderance of the evidence standard. See supra note
43; Note, supra note 29, at 1619 ("Because no particularistic evidence exists in most toxic waste
cases, the strong version of the preponderance rule would bar most toxic waste suits.").
50. But see J. THOMSON, supra note 23, at 228-29 (suggesting that one ought not be moved by
these differences).
51. Prosser indicates that when the defendant has violated a duty, although the evidence is not
exact, the courts "allow a certain liberality to the jury in drawing its conclusion." PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 1, § 41 at 270. In the area of res ipsa loquitur, a converse proposition exists:
when the defendant is shown to have had control over the object that caused the harm (i.e., the
defendant caused the harm) but the nature of defendant's act is unknown, the element of negligence
may be proved with probabilistic evidence.
Nesson contrasts his position favoring an all-or-nothing award with the disfavored position of
proportionate damages in a case such as Smith. He correctly points out that the proportionate
damage rule in a case such as Smith does not promote care and safety. Yet as between the case of
certain negligence/uncertain causation and the case of uncertain negligence/uncertain causation
(e.g. Smith), he recognizes that in the former case the rule of proportionate damages and its behav-
ioral message about wrongful activity "seem[s] sensible enough." Nesson, supra note 31, at 1382-85.
Nesson does not explore further the value of proportionate damages in the former case.
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B. Inconsistent Use of Probabilistic Evidence
Although Cooper supports the admissibility of probabilistic evidence, it also
flags a problem inherent in the legal system's use of that evidence. In Reynolds
the chance of a misstep by plaintiff in her fall down the railway's steps was so
slim that the factfinder could believe that there was actual causation. In con-
trast, Cooper requires the factfinder only to believe in the probability of causa-
tion. The problem is that belief in the probability of causation is used to prove
too much: it is used to prove the fact of causation.
Unfortunately, the preponderance of the evidence standard traditionally
has been an all-or-nothing approach in which the sufficiency of the evidence
establishes the fact of causation, not the probability of causation. This approach
fails to consider the range of doubt that may exist in a factfinder's mind between
belief in the fact of causation and belief in the fact of no causation. If the weight
of the evidence is on the side of one of the parties, that party wins full relief even
though the factfinder may not completely believe the fact that the evidence is
designed to show. This approach is mistaken, for reasons of efficiency and cor-
rective justice described in section one above. The evidence that only proves a
probability should generate remedial relief in accordance with this probability.
Because Cooper would allow evidence to show a 51% probability of causation, it
should allow only a 51% recovery for the harm suffered.
A proportional liability rule would eliminate inconsistent uses of probabilis-
tic evidence by the courts.5 2 This inconsistency can be illustrated by a compari-
son of the following two examples. Suppose that five pranksters each negligently
threw a rock in the direction of a road and a passerby was hurt by one of the
rocks but the rock could not be traced to any one of the pranksters. A technical
application of the preponderance of the evidence standard for proof of but for
causation for any one of the pranksters would result in no liability. Fortunately
under the present system, by treating all the negligent actors together as one,
proof of but for causation is established by a preponderance of the evidence, and
each prankster would be held liable for 20% of the harm caused. 53 But suppose
that one prankster negligently threw a rock in the direction of the road as four
other rocks tumbled from a cliff and the rock that hit the passerby could not be
distinguished. In such a case no ground exists for establishing causation by a
preponderance of the evidence, and under our present legal rules the prankster
would be absolved from liability.
The act of the lone prankster in the second case is no different from the act
of any one of the pranksters in the first case. Liability for twenty percent of the
52. Why probable causation results in full liability in some cases and only partial liability in
others has never been fully explained. See Wright, The Efficiency Theory of Causation and Responsi-
bility: Unscientific Formalism and False Semantics, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 553, 576 (1987).
53. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980) (harm caused by drug manufactured by one of several defendants); see
also Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948) (similar facts but finding joint and several
liability). These cases address the notion of "alternative liability" (causation by one defendant or
another), not joint causation (causation by one defendant with another) or contributory/comparative




harm caused should be imposed on the lone prankster as well. By so tainting
himself with negligence he has assumed the risk of liability for harm that may
have resulted (even if it did not necessarily result) from his actions.5 4 He should
suffer the consequences of the probability that his wrongful act has harmed the
plaintiff. A proportional liability rule would impose a twenty percent liability on
the lone prankster.
C. Substantial Possibility Test
In some cases the courts have recognized a need to give relief to plaintiffs
who can prove a probability of causation, even though that probability is less
than fifty percent. The need is legitimate but the means used by these courts
have been misdirected. These courts have abandoned the preponderance of the
evidence standard in favor of what has been called the substantial possibility
test.5 5 The remedy, however, once again does not accord with the facts estab-
lished by the evidence. Under the substantial possibility test the plaintiff is
awarded full damages instead of a proportional recovery.
The substantial possibility test was first articulated in Hicks v. United
States,5 6 a case in which plaintiff's decedent died eight hours after a doctor neg-
ligently diagnosed a massive intestinal hemorrhage as stomach flu.5 7 The trial
court found that plaintiff had failed to establish but for causation between the
doctor's negligence and the death. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit reversed, noting:
When a defendant's negligent action or inaction has effectively
terminated a person's chance of survival, it does not lie in the defend-
ant's mouth to raise conjectures as to the measure of the chances that
he has put beyond the possibility of realization. If there was any sub-
stantial possibility of survival and the defendant has destroyed it, he is
54. This risk of liability may be assumed not only for a negligent act. When a person decides to
engage in an ultrahazardous activity, he ordinarily takes the risk of all harm that ensues, even if he
can prove that he has exercised all due care under the circumstances. Under product liability law a
manufacturer assumes the risk that her product may have a defect that causes an injury despite the
exercise of due care. Here again the risk of liability for harm that only may have resulted from the
defect may be assumed.
55. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 431-33 (1965); J. FLEMING, THE LAW OF
TORTS 182-84 (5th ed. 1977); PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 1, at 272; Note, Increased Risk of
Harm: A New Standard for Sufficiency of Evidence of Causation in Medical Malpractice Cases, 65
B.U.L. REv. 275 (1985); Note, Proving Causation in "Loss of Chance" Cases: A Proportional Ap-
proach, 34 CATH. U.L. REV. 747 (1985).
The "substantial possibility" test differs from the "substantial factor" test, which has nothing to
do with uncertainty. The "substantial factor" test applies in situations in which two or more causes
coming together produce a harm, and either one of them alone would have produced the harm. The
classic example is the defendant who sets a fire that merges with another fire to burn down the
plaintiff's house. See Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. Ry., 146 Minn. 430, 179 N.W. 45
(1920); Kingston v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 191 Wis. 610, 211 N.W. 913 (1927). As explained in
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, at 267:
In such cases it is quite clear that each cause has in fact played so important a part in
producing the result that responsibility should be imposed upon it; and it is equally clear
that neither can be absolved from that responsibility upon the ground that the identical
harm would have occurred without it, or there would be no liability at all.
56. 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966).
57. Id. at 629.
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answerable. 58
The Hicks decision provides little guidance as to the meaning of "substan-
tial possibility."' 59 Some courts have treated substantial possibility as meaning
"more likely than not." The plaintiff's injury must have resulted "more likely"
or "more probably" from defendant's action rather than from any other cause.60
Under this interpretation the standard is no different than the greater than 50%
probability standard.
Other courts have permitted recovery under the Hicks standard when a
plaintiff establishes less than a 50% probability of causation. For example, in
Kallenberg v. Beth Israel Hosp.,61 doctors prescribed but negligently failed to
administer the drug Naturetin to a patient suffering her third hemorrhage from
a cerebral aneurysm. Naturetin would have reduced her blood pressure and was
considered necessary to prepare the patient for surgery. 62 According to expert
testimony, the failure to give Naturetin was a "producing, contributing factor"
to her death. If she had been properly treated, she would have had a "'20, say
30, maybe 40% chance of survival' with surgery and surgery could have been
performed if proper drugs had been administered."' 63 The court allowed the
evidence to go to the jury, which found that the failure to administer Naturetin
was the cause of death. 64
In some cases, the substantial possibility test has been confused with the
language of substantial factor.65 In Hamil v. Bashline,66 the hospital was negli-
gent in failing to locate an electrocardiogram machine, requiring the patient to
visit a private physician. The patient died of a heart attack in the doctor's pri-
vate office. At trial, one expert testified that the patient would have had a 75%
58. Id. at 632 (emphasis added).
59. The expert testimony in Hicks suggested that the patient would have survived with surgery.
Hicks, 368 F.2d at 632. Numerous commentators have pointed out that the testimony in Hicks, if
believed by the jury, would have satisfied the preponderance test. See, e.g., King, Causation, Valua-
tion, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences,
90 YALE L.J. 1353, 1368-69 n.53 (1981); Wolfstone and Wolfstone, Recovery of Damagesfor the
Loss ofa Chance, 28 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 121, 133 (1982); see also Gooding v. University Hosp.
Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015, 1019 (Fla. 1984).
60. E.g., Fitzgerald v. Manning, 679 F.2d 341, 356 (4th Cir. 1982).
61. 45 A.D.2d 177, 357 N.Y.S.2d 508 (1974), aff'd, 37 N.Y.2d 719, 337 N.E.2d 128, 374
N.Y.S.2d 615 (1975).
62. Id. at 178, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 509.
63. Id., 357 N.Y.S.2d at 510.
64. Id. The dissent noted that the patient's condition was terminal and therefore the doctors'
negligence was not the cause of death. Id. at 181, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 512. See also Waffen, 799 F.2d at
911 (under Maryland law, "the chance of survival need not have been fifty-one percent or more
before it was reduced" for the plaintiff to have a cause of action); Jeanes v. Milner, 428 F.2d 598, 609
(8th Cir. 1970) (court reversed dismissal of cause of action, disagreeing with trial court's conclusion
that the loss of an 11% chance of survival provided an insufficient basis for the jury to find butfor
causation); Roberson v. Counselman, 235 Kan. 1006, 1021, 686 P.2d 149, 160 (1984) (substantial
possibility question for jury where plaintiffs estimated chance of survival at 40%); Thomas v. Corso,
265 Md. 84, 288 A.2d 379 (1972). But see Alfonso v. Lund, 783 F.2d 958 (10th Cir. 1986), discussed
critically in Note, Alfonso v. Lund: Loss of Chance Rejected as a Basis for Recovery in Medical
Malpractice, 12 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 187 (1987).
65. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 41.
66. 481 Pa. 256, 392 A.2d 1280 (1978).
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chance of survival if proper treatment had been administered at the hospital.67
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that evidence of causation was sufficient
when (1) "a plaintiff has introduced evidence that a defendant's negligent act or
omission increased the risk of harm," and (2) the jury determines that the "in-
creased risk was a substantial factor in producing the harm."
68
In Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound,69 defendant neg-
ligently failed to diagnose a patient's lung cancer. A year later, the condition
was diagnosed by another physician. Expert testimony indicated that the pa-
tient would have had a 39% chance of survival had the lung cancer been timely
diagnosed, but that the delayed diagnosis reduced his chances of survival to
25%.70 The court applied the Hamil standard and allowed the case to go to the
jury on the issue of causation to determine whether the increased risk was "a
substantial factor in bringing about the resultant harm." 7 1 If the jury found
causation, full damages would be awarded for the harm caused by premature
death .72
Regardless of the terminology, the use of the substantial possibility test
demonstrates the perception in some courts of the injustice in refusing relief
when the probability of causation is greater than 0% but less than 50%. These
courts have decided that 50% need not be the cut-off point for liability when a
defendant's negligence has deprived the decedent of at least a "significant"
chance to survive. They allow the jury to consider evidence that shows less than
a 50% chance that defendant's negligence caused decedent's harm.
The problem with the substantial possibility test is not in the inclination of
the courts to ascribe liability in situations when the probability of causation is
less than 50%; it is in their ascribing full liability in such situations. By failing
to distinguish between what is proved and how it is to be proved, the courts have
failed to examine the possibility of changing the remedial aspects of their
cases.73 They assume that the fact of causation is the "what" to be proved and is
not in question for them; thus, they only discuss "how" the fact of causation is
to be proved. Because justice requires relief, their conclusion is to alter the stan-
dard of proof to provide relief. The result is full liability for less than a 50%
chance of causation, and this result is both inefficient and unfair.74 If the courts
were to adopt a proportional liability rule, they would give relief when justice
requires, but only to the extent that justice requires. The proportional liability
approach would examine the problem from the perspective of what is to be
67. Id. at 263, 392 A.2d at 1283.
68. Id. at 273, 392 A.2d at 1288.
69. 99 Wash. 2d 609, 664 P.2d 474 (1983).
70. Id. at 614, 664 P.2d at 476-77.
71. Id. at 617, 664 P.2d at 478.
72. See also the cases cited in note 35.11 of PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 41 (1988
Supp.). The substantial possibility test was not applied by the Washington court, however, in a case
of legal malpractice. See Daugert v. Pappas, 104 Wash. 2d 254, 704 P.2d 600 (1985).
73. In Herskovits Justice Pearson's concurring opinion, joined by three other justices, criticized
this all-or-nothing approach and advocated an award of damages proportional to the probability of
causation. Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 634, 664 P.2d at 487 (Pearson, J., concurring).
74. See supra Section One.
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proved. 75
Once the discussion moves from the problem of proving the fact of causa-
tion with probabilistic evidence to the problem of proving the probability of the
fact of causation, there is no inherent conflict between what is to be proved and
how it is to be proved. The preponderance of the evidence standard, as well as
the substantial possibility test, are unnecessary to set minimum threshold levels
of evidence for proof of the fact. Rather, the evidence is meshed with the result
in the case. Following a proportional liability rule would permit (1) the consid-
eration of liability in the case of probabilities less than 50%, and (2) the adjust-
ment of the damage remedy to accord with the probability that is proved. In the
same way that the fact of causation generates full liability for the harm caused,
the probability of the fact of causation, whatever that probability may be, would
generate partial liability for the expectation of harm caused. It is no wonder that
in one area of tort law the first steps toward adoption of a proportional liability
rule have already been taken.
III. FIRST STEPS TOWARD A PROPORTIONAL LIABILITY RULE
A. California Cases
In Ybarra v. Spangard 76 plaintiff suffered paralysis and atrophy of the mus-
cles around his shoulder following an operation involving two physicians, an
anesthetist, and a special nurse.7 7 Although plaintiff could not show that any
one defendant was responsible for the injury he suffered, the court reversed judg-
ments of nonsuit as to all defendants. 78 The court invoked the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur to allow the jury to find negligence and concluded:
We merely hold that where a plaintiff receives unusual injuries while
unconscious and in the course of medical treatment, all those defend-
ants who had any control over his body or the instrumentalities which
might have caused the injuries may properly be called upon to meet
the inference of negligence by giving an explanation of their conduct.7 9
What was unusual in this case was the insufficiency of the evidence to prove that
75. Charles Nesson recognized the failure on the part of courts to distinguish the "what" from
the "how." He stated:
Casting these issues as problems of proof serves only to obscure them. The cases [that deal
with proportional liability] concern changing the elements of the substantive legal rule; the
problem of proof is simply that of generating acceptable conclusions about those elements.
Although the traditional logic of proof rules can inhibit judicial efforts to find liability
when the evidence is merely statistical, we should recognize that courts can nevertheless
find liability and generate new substantive law by redefining the elements of the legal rule
and the sanction so they reflect the statistical nature of the evidence. The current reluc-
tance of the judicial system to impose liability in such situations cannot be overcome by
changing the grammar of proof, because this grammar is essential to achieving the projec-
tion and affirmation of the law's behavioral norms. Instead, reform must come, and should
be welcomed, by bringing about changes in the factual elements that must be proved.
Nesson, supra note 31, at 1384-85 (footnotes omitted).
76. 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
77. 25 Cal. 2d at 488, 154 P.2d at 688.




any one of the defendants had caused the harm. Yet the court used a theory of
interpersonal responsibility to hold each of the defendants responsible for the
harm caused.
Four years later the court extended the idea of interpersonal liability from a
group of medical people working together to a pair of hunters who were hunting
together. In Summers v. Tice8 0 plaintiff was struck in his right eye and face by
birdshot discharged by the shotgun of one of two hunters who were negligent. 81
It was uncertain which of the two defendants had fired the injuring shot, but the
court found that defendants were jointly and severally liable and that they
should work out for themselves any apportionment of the damages.8 2 Although
the general rule is that two or more tortfeasors acting independently of each
other are not joint tortfeasors and the plaintiff must establish the portion of
damage caused by each, the court found in this case that "the innocent wronged
party should be not deprived of his right to redress" when the matter of appor-
tionment is incapable of proof.83
The rule of these two California cases was extended in Sindell v. Abbott
Laboratories 84 to a "market share" theory of liability. The idea of interpersonal
liability was discarded, and each defendant who was negligent was charged with
an amount of the harm proportionate to the probability that it caused the harm
among the other defendants.8 5 In Sindell the plaintiff developed cancer as a
result of a drug, diethylstilbesterol (DES), administered during pregnancy.8 6
The question before the court was whether liability could be ascribed to the
major companies that produced most of the drug marketed when it was not
more probable than not that any one company produced the drug that caused
the cancer in plaintiff.8 7 The court found that not only could the manufacturers
be liable, but "each manufacturer's liability for an injury would be approxi-
80. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
81. 33 Cal. 2d at 82, 199 P.2d at 1-2.
82. 33 Cal. 2d at 88, 199 P.2d at 5.
83. Id. The Summers rule has been embodied in the Second Restatement of Torts. 2 RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 443B(3) (1965) provides as follows:
Where the conduct of two or more actors is tortious, and it has been proved that harm has
been caused to plaintiff by only one of them, but there is uncertainty as to which one has
caused it, the burden is upon each such actor to prove that he has not caused the harm.
In Burton v. Waller, 502 F.2d 1261, 1282-84 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 964 (1975),
the conduct of some of the actors was not negligent and the court refused to follow two Mississippi
cases similar to Summers.
84. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). For
another case adopting the market share approach, see Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d
581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984). See also Collins v. Eli Lilly, Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37 (court
rejects market share liability theory in favor of apportionment of liability through comparative negli-
gence), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984). See generally Fisher, Products Liability--An Analysis of
Market Share Liability, 34 VAND. L. REv. 1623 (1981); Robinson, supra note 3; Comment, Refining
Market Share Liability: Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 33 STAN. L. REv. 937 (1981); Note, Sindell
v. Abbott Laboratories: A Market Share Approach to DES Causation, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 1179
(1981); Note, Market Share Liability: An Answer to the DES Causation Problem, 94 HARV. L. REv.
668 (1981).
85. The case leaves some question whether it was grounded on negligence or strict liability.
86. 26 Cal. 3d at 594-95, 607 P.2d at 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
87. 26 Cal. 3d at 598-99, 607 P.2d at 928, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
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mately equivalent to the damages caused by the DES it manufactured. 88 It was
not necessary that the plaintiff prove that a particular manufacturer's conduct
more likely than not caused the injury.
Summers and Sindell imposed liability in each situation on independent
tortfeasors as a group even though proof of causation for any one of the
tortfeasors was not possible under the preponderance of the evidence standard.
These were not the type of cases in which the law traditionally imposes joint and
several liability when two or more tortfeasors combine to produce an injury.
These California cases directly raised the issue of uncertainty of the causation
itself and solved it by imposing liability on both tortfeasors in Summers and on
each tortfeasor according to the probability of causation among the defendants
in Sindell. It is but a small step from the Sindell "market share" theory of
liability to a comprehensive proportional liability rule that determines a single
defendant's damages according to the probability that his wrong has caused the
harm. If a defendant manufacturer in a Sindell situation may be held liable for
its market share proportion of the plaintiff's damages, then there is no reason
why any tortfeasor should not be held liable for her share of damages to a plain-
tiff based on the probability that her conduct was the cause of the harm.8 9
B. Delgado and Rosenberg
Richard Delgado and David Rosenberg have proposed a proportional dam-
ages approach in mass exposure cases. 90 Both note the inequities of the all-or-
nothing rule. Delgado proposes that plaintiffs in mass exposure cases should
share damages with other members of the class who have suffered damages from
88. 26 Cal. 3d at 613, 607 P.2d at 938, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146. The court in Sindell required that
the plaintiffsue a defendant group that had manufactured a substantial share of the harmful drug. It
then allocated damages from each defendant according to its share of the total amount of the drug
manufactured by the defendants. A more precise approximation of the expected damages caused by
the drug manufactured by each defendant would have been achieved by allocating damages from
each defendant according to its share of the total amount of the drug manufactured by defendants
and nondefendants alike. The difference between these two formulations, however, becomes insignif-
icant as the size of the defendant group approaches the whole group of manufacturers in the market.
See J. THOMSON, supra note 23, at 211-15.
89. Richard Wright in Wright, supra note 1, at 1817, distinguishes Summers from a case of
reduced chance of avoiding injury by the fact that in Summers "we know that one of the defendants
is being held liable for an injury to which he did not contribute." This distinction is artificial. In the
case of reduced chance of avoiding injury, either the defendant or the plaintiff is being held liable for
an injury for which he is not responsible. If the defendant's wrongdoing actually caused the injury
then the plaintiff should not have to bear any of the harm (i.e., the plaintiff should be recompensed in
damages), and if there is no causation, defendant should not have to pay damages.
90. Delgado, supra note 3; Rosenberg, supra note 3; see also Landes & Posner, supra note 3;
Rizzo & Arnold, supra note 3; Robinson, supra note 3, at 759-69; Robinson, supra note 8.
Mass exposure torts include those involving asbestos, Agent Orange, Agent White, Three-Mile
Island, atomic bomb testing, Benedictin, swine flu vaccination, ingestion of aspirin by children with
influenza or chicken pox, dioxin, DES, PCB, PBB, and IUD. See Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 853;
Novick, supra note 3, at 540-41. W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 4, at 242, 260-69, present the
case of a nuclear reactor that wrongfully emits radiation and raises the number of cancers in the area
from 100 to 110. It is not known which of the 110 cancers have been caused by the radiation.
Landes and Posner examine various methods for dealing with this problem, including proportional
liability whereby each cancer victim is given 9% ((110-100)/i 10) of his damages. They comment,
however, that this "is an approach so much at variance with traditional tort law thinking that it
could not be adopted without a profound revolution in that thinking." Id. at 265.
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nontortious causes in exchange for a relaxed burden of proof.91 He would shift
the burden of proof to the defendant to prove noncausation with respect to each
plaintiff's injury. To obtain relaxation of the burden of proof, the plaintiff would
have to show: (1) injury, (2) that the injury is one that could have resulted from
either natural or human causes, acting separately and without synergy, (3) that
it is impossible to determine the cause of the injury, (4) that the defendant is the
only possible human cause, and (5) that other factors are stable so that the in-
creased number of victims can be accurately calculated.
92
Rosenberg's theory is similar. He suggests in mass exposure cases
the replacement of the preponderance rule by a standard of propor-
tional liability. Under such a standard, courts would impose liability
and distribute compensation in proportion to the probability of causa-
tion assigned to the excess risk in the exposed population, regardless
whether that probability fell above or below the fifty-percent threshold
and despite the absence of individualized proof of the causation
connection.
93
Delgado and Rosenberg have extended the idea of proportional liability to
defendants who have caused a risk of harm to masses of plaintiffs. The next step
is to extend it to the individual plaintiff whose injury may have been caused (has
a probability of having been caused) by an individual defendant. Delgado and
Rosenberg hesitate at this point. Delgado believes that the case of medical mal-
practice in which an improper refusal to perform an operation decreases the
chances of survival from 40% to 25% differs from the case in which members,
albeit undetermined, of a class have suffered an undisputed tortious harm.94 Ro-
senberg's article explicitly addresses only mass exposure cases. Indeed, he notes:
The preponderance rule may be adequate for the set of sporadic acci-
dent cases in which causal indeterminacy arises randomly and always
signifies a substantial chance that the defendant in fact harmed no one.
But the rule is neither a rational nor a just means of resolving the
systematic causal indeterminacy presented by mass exposure cases in-
volving defendants whose tortious conduct has caused or will cause a
statistically ascertainable increase in the incidence of a particular
91. Delgado calls this approach a "reverse-Sindell" doctrine. Delgado, supra note 3, at 882-83.
In Sindell the problem was to identify who of several wrongdoers caused harm to known victims of
the wrongdoers. In the mass exposure cases the problem is to identify who are the victims of wrong-
doing caused by a known wrongdoer. In both cases causation is a probability based on statistics. See
Note, supra note 29, at 1621, 1634 (defining the problem in the former as one of legal causation and
in the latter as one of medical causation); see also Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 856.
Delgado, supra note 3, at 900-01, suggests the class action as a vehicle through which damages
could be awarded to a class of plaintiffs:
The named plaintiff would thus prosecute a representative suit, and would be bound by the
rules normally applied in such cases, including a fiduciary relationship to the class mem-
bers. The plaintiff class, if successful, would recover an amount corresponding to its com-
bined losses attributed to defendant's actions. This amount would be allocated among the
members pro rata, after subtracting litigation costs.
92. Delgado, supra note 3, at 899-900.
93. Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 859.
94. See Delgado, supra note 3, at 889 ("But unlike the surgical victim, the persons in our para-
digm [a class of 190 members who suffer injury because of one of two factors causing harm] do not
know that human causes are responsible, even in part, for their injury; they merely suspect it.").
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disease. 95
Admittedly, there is a factual difference between conduct that has a given
probability of having caused harm to a particular individual and conduct that is
nearly certain to have caused harm to some one of a number of individuals, but
the difference is not legally significant. Although it has been used to distinguish
between the proportionality rule in cases such as Sindell and the preponderance
standard in other cases, 96 both types of cases have the same objectives of effi-
ciency and corrective justice97 that are furthered by the proportionality ap-
proach. Indeed the two types of cases are merely different aspects of the same
problem as illustrated in the hypothetical case that follows.
Suppose that a doctor uses a certain negligent procedure one hundred times
in a given year. Under a nonnegligent procedure, six of her patients would have
suffered injury during the course of the year. Under the negligent procedure
employed by the doctor, ten patients do suffer an injury, costing each patient
$1,000. Expert testimony can establish that the increased incidence of injury
results from the negligent procedure. In this situation, proportional damages
are appropriate according to the commentators advocating the proportional ap-
proach in mass exposure cases. Harm has actually occurred and damages
should be allocated to each of the ten patients in the amount of $400 (4/10 x
$1,000), because the injuries caused by the negligence cannot be differentiated
from those attributable to nonnegligent causes. On the other hand, if the doctor
uses the negligent procedure only once instead of a hundred times and the pa-
tient is injured, Delgado and Rosenberg do not advocate recovery. There is no
certainty that the doctor has caused harm. Yet in this situation there exists the
same probability (40%)98 that the patient has been injured by the negligence of
the doctor. What difference does it make whether the doctor treats one or one
hundred patients in a negligent manner? Each patient who has suffered an in-
jury has the same probability of having received it from the negligence of the
doctor.
What would happen if, after the first patient is injured and sues but is un-
able to recover, that patient is again injured and sues? There is then a 64%
chance99 that at least one of the two negligent acts of the doctor has caused
harm to the patient. Should the patient now be allowed to recover? Suppose
three more acts of negligence take place accompanied by harm. There is then a
92% chancet° ° that one of the five harms has been caused by the doctor's negli-
gence. If we allow the patient to recover damages at this point after having
95. Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 858.
96. See Delgado, supra note 3, at 904; Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 883; Note, supra note 29, at
1626.
97. See supra Section One.
98. The determination of this probability is based on the fact that the doctor was negligent and
that studies indicate that four in ten cases of harm statistically are caused by the negligent procedure.
99. The chance that the doctor's negligence did not cause either of the two harms is .60 x .60 =
.36. See Delgado, supra note 3, at 895 n.77 (citing C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE 492-93 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972)).
100. The chance that the doctor's negligence did not cause any of the five harms is .60 x .60 x .60
x .60 x .60 = .0778.
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refused to allow her to recover the first time, the results are inconsistent. 101
Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that the proportionality approach will
work as well in mass exposure cases, because of the infinite number of variables
presented, as it will in individual exposure cases. As Delgado has explained
concerning relief in mass exposure cases:
The principal difficulties will arise from the requirements that there be
only one possible human cause, and that the population, mode of risk,
and other variables be stable enough to permit a statistical calculation
of the increased number of injuries above a background level. Such a
suit will be impossible if, for example, the population is shifting or
highly mobile, or if the background rate of the disease or injury varies
greatly. [Such a] suit will also be barred if there is not one but a multi-
tude of potential human defendants, as might be the case in a region
that contains several polluters. 1 2
An example of the problem of applying the proportionality rule in mass
exposure case's is the Agent Orange litigation.1 03 Vietnam veterans and their
families brought suit against manufacturers of Agent Orange and other herbi-
cides containing dioxin.1° 4 In addition to facing an indeterminate defendant
problem, plaintiffs were not able to show a direct relation between their injuries
and Agent Orange. Consequently, they relied on statistics to show the increased
101. Though Professor Delgado may have recognized this inconsistency, he does nothing to inte-
grate the case of single-victim causal uncertainty in his theory. See Delgado, supra note 3, at 895-96
n.77, 905 n.112.
102. Id. at 906-07; see Note, supra note 29, at 1618, 1623, 1627. After pointing out the many
problems with the proportionality model, Delgado suggests the types of situations in which he feels
the model might work in practice: "The requirements ... would be most easily satisfied in connec-
tion with immobile or 'captive' populations, such as members of a workforce, inmates of a mental or
penal institution, students at a school, or residents of small, isolated communities." Delgado, supra
note 3, at 907. In other words, Delgado acknowledges that the proportionality rule in mass exposure
cases has an extremely narrow application. Compare this conclusion with that of Professor
Rosenberg:
In addition, the centralized corporate sources, statistical predictability, massive scale, and
relative uniformity of disease risks indicate that mass exposure cases may be amenable to
aggregative rather than traditional case-by-case procedures, and thus less costly to adjudi-
cate-on a per-claim basis-than are an equal or greater number of sporadic accident
claims. Many victims may simultaneously have come into contact with a toxic substance
from a pollution hazard. Even if the victims' exposure to the toxic substance came about
through their separate consumption of some product or service, all or at least large and
gradable subclasses of those exposed will be similarly situated with regard to their degree of
disease risk, their relationship to the firm, and the circumstances surrounding the tortious
conduct. This uniformity of conditions enables courts not only to adjudicate a multitude of
mass exposure claims efficiently, but also to increase the net compensation that each claim-
ant receives.
Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 855 (footnote omitted).
103. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 603 F. Supp. 239 (E.D.N.Y 1985); 104 F.R.D. 559
(E.D.N.Y. 1985); 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); 580 F. Supp. 1242 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); 580 F.
Supp. 690 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), mandamus denied, 733 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1984), appeal dismissed, 745
F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1984); 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), modified, 100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y.
1983), mandamus denied, 725 F.2d 858 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984); In re Agent
Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 737 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd, 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981). See generally Sherman, Agent Orange and the Problem of the
Indeterminate Plaintiff, 52 BROOKLYN L. REv. 369 (1986) (criticizing the theory of proportional
liability advanced by Judge Weinstein in the Agent Orange settlement decision).
104. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 776-77 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
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risk of harm suffered by those exposed to the deadly herbicide.10 5 Although the
Agent Orange litigation was settled without reaching the indeterminate plaintiff
problem, the court discussed the causation problems in the course of approving
the settlement. The court recognized that it was impossible to find with cer-
tainty that the harm suffered by individual plaintiffs was caused by Agent Or-
ange.10 6 Furthermore, although a proportional recovery approach could be
used to solve this problem in some mass exposure cases, 10 7 there were practical
problems with using a proportional recovery approach in Agent Orange. First,
there were wide differences in the degree to which service personnel were ex-
posed to Agent Orange. Some personnel had frequented areas where the herbi-
cide was sprayed, while others had had only indirect contact through shipping
or spraying.10 8 Furthermore, servicemen were exposed for widely varying peri-
ods of time. An application of the proportionality rule under such disparate
circumstances would be distorted and thus inequitable. 109
105. Id. at 780, 782-85.
106. Judge Weinstein noted:
While it may be possible to prove, through the use of such proof as laboratory tests on
animals and epidemiological evidence, that such harm-for example cancer-can be
"caused" by a particular substance, it may be impossible to pinpoint which particular per-
son's cancer would have occurred naturally and which would not have occurred but for
exposure to the substance.
Id. at 834.
107. Id. at 838.
108. Id. at 817-19.
109. See, e.g., Wojciechowski v. Republic Steel Corp., 67 A.D.2d 830, 413 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1979)
(class certification inappropriate to determine whether dust from defendant's plant was the cause-in-
fact of plaintiffs' damages; individual determinations necessary); Rosenfeld v. A.H. Robins Co., 63
A.D.2d 11,407 N.Y.S.2d 196, appeal dismissed, 46 N.Y.2d 731, 385 N.E.2d 1301, 413 N.Y.S.2d 374
(1978) (class certification denied in IUD case; individual determination required).
Another widely known mass exposure case is the Love Canal incident, where toxic waste mater-
ials seeped into a residential neighborhood. Professors Ginsberg and Weiss discussed the problem of
determining causation in the Love Canal situation:
[Proof of causation] will be formidable because chemicals released into ground water or the
atmosphere may combine with one another to form new compounds, and may change their
characteristics or become diluted when exposed to the elements. In addition, the responses
which contaminants produce after human ingestion may vary both temporally and in kind
from individual to individual, making it difficult to attribute a particular illness to a partic-
ular chemical or combination of chemicals. Consequently, where several potentially haz-
ardous substances are present, plaintiffs may be unable to show that their injuries resulted
from exposure to one whose source or hauler is before the court or one over which the
defendant site owner exercised control. Particularly where disease becomes manifest only
after a prolonged period, as in the case of carcinogens, the question of intervening or con-
tributing causes may add to the uncertainty. The difficulty of establishing a direct causal
link between one of several substances deposited in 1950 and symptoms of cancer first
recognized in 1978 is apparent. If the affected plaintiff is also a tobacco user or worked in a
chemical plant, the level of certainty required by the legal system may be impossible to
attain.
Ginsberg & Weiss, Common Law Liability for Toxic Torts: A Phantom Remedy, 9 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 859, 922-923 (1981) (footnotes omitted).
Given the difficulties of a proportional liability rule in toxic tort cases, alternative methods for
imposing liability and compensating plaintiffs are enterprise liability, see Note, supra note 29, at
1627-30, and administrative compensation, see id. at 1631-60. Daniel Farber has proposed that the
defendant be charged with the damages of his toxic tort, but that damages be awarded in a way that
fully compensates the most likely victims of the harm he has caused when the risk is not uniform
across the class of patients. Farber, supra note 3, at 1243-51.
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Mass exposure cases present a large number of extraneous factors that
might interfere with the process of determining probabilities of causation. The
number of extraneous factors, however, tends to be more limited in cases in
which the wrongful act is more directly linked with an individual plaintiff. For
example, in New York Central Railway Co. v. Grimstad 110 and Kirincich v. Stan-
dard Dredging Co. 111 the injuries followed directly upon negligent conduct; the
probability of causation could be determined without considering a large
number of other factors.
In Grimstad plaintiff's decedent drowned after falling off the side of a
barge. The court found that while defendant was negligent in failing to equip
the barge with life buoys, the negligence was not the but for cause of the death.
The court reasoned that "there is nothing whatever to show that the decedent
was not drowned because he did not know how to swim, nor anything to show
that, if there had been a life buoy on board, [he] would have got it in time
"112
In Kirincich v. Standard Dredging plaintiff's decedent fell off defendant's
barge, which was not equipped with adequate lifesaving equipment. The trial
court found for the defendant, but the appeals court reversed, noting that the
decedent had actually reached for the line tossed to him, and but for the small
size and limited buoyancy of the line, he would have been able to grasp and hold
onto it.
1 1 3
Grimstad and Kirincich present very few factors complicating the analysis
whether there is a causal link between the negligence and the injury. The causal
link is easier to consider than in a case such as Agent Orange. On the other
hand, it is by no means certain that a causal link does or does not exist. Landes
and Posner suggest that "[t]he difference between the two cases is not that Grim-
stad would have died even if the defendant in that case had taken care and
Kirincich would have been saved, but that there was a greater probability that
care would have been effective in Kirincich's case than in Grimstad's."1 14 The
problem in these two cases is that-the all-or-nothing approach does not reflect
how close the cases really are. If a proportionality approach had been applied,
110. 264 F. 334 (2d Cir. 1920).
111. 112 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1940).
112. Grimstad, 264 F. at 335.
113. Kirincich, 112 F.2d at 165. In reaching this conclusion, the Kirincich court stated that it
chose to follow the wisdom of Judge Learned Hand in a similar case in which a seaman fell over-
board in a storm and drowned. Zinnel v. United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 10 F.2d
47, 49 (2d Cir. 1925). In Zinnel there was no guard rope on the ship to prevent intestate's fall.
Judge Hand noted:
There of course remains the question whether they might have also said that the fault
caused the loss. About that we agree no certain conclusion was possible. Nobody could, in
the nature of things, be sure that the intestate would have seized the rope, or, if he had not,
that it would have stopped his body. But we are not dealing with a criminal case, nor are
we justified, where certainty is impossible, in insisting upon it.
Zinnel, 10 F.2d at 49.
114. Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 122. Landes and Posner also suggest that in a case such
as Grimstad, as opposed to Kirincich, "the costs of legal proceedings are apt to exceed the allocative
benefits from inducing potential injurers to spend additional sources on z amount of care." W.
LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 4, at 240.
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recovery based on the probability of causation in each case would have produced
more coherent results. Proportional damages are particularly appropriate in
cases such as these and the medical malpractice cases.' 15
Why do Delgado and Rosenberg confine their attention to mass exposure
cases? It may be that the inclusion of single exposure cases poses a conflict with
the existing preponderance of the evidence standard. When there is a greater
than 50% chance that defendant has caused some harm within a group of plain-
tiffs, the preponderance of the evidence standard can be used at least in a general
sense to impose liability, even though the chance that defendant has caused
harm to a specific individual is less than 50%. In single exposure cases when
this greater than 50% chance does not exist, the preponderance of the evidence
standard cannot be used even in a general sense to impose liability. The answer
to this conflict is to abandon the preponderance of the evidence standard. 16
C. King
Joseph King offers another perspective on proportional liability. 1 17 In
cases of personal injuries involving victims suffering from preexisting conditions,
he advocates recovery of damages proportional to the probability that the injury
was caused by defendant. But King does not perceive the problem in this case as
one of uncertain causation. He treats this situation as a problem of identifying
and measuring the actual loss that the defendant has caused, and the actual loss
is the loss of a chance of benefit. For example, if defendant's negligent act has
diminished a victim's chances of survival from 95% to 5%, it destroys a 90%
chance of life. The loss of this chance of life is an actual loss that should be
charged against the defendant and may be valued at 90% of the value of the life.
According to King there is no need to mix this question with one of
causation. 118
Taken to its logical conclusion, King's approach would compensate for the
loss of a chance of benefit, whether or not the benefit itself lost. Yet King does
not actually espouse this view. Throughout his article he offers examples of
compensation for a lost chance of benefit only after the benefit itself was lost"19
or while there is still a chance that the benefit may be lost. 120 He does not offer
examples of compensation for loss of a chance of a benefit after it is known that
the benefit will not be lost.' 2' If defendant's negligent act diminished a victim's
115. For example, the proportional damages approach is useful in cases in which it is uncertain
whether plantiff's cancer is of traumatic origin. In one case, for example, plaintiff developed cancer
of the larynx after inhaling glass during an automobile collision. McGrath v. Irving, 24 A.D.2d 236,
265 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1965). Expert testimony was conflicting as to whether the cancer was caused by
the accident. See generally Comment, Judicial Attitudes Toward Legal and Scientific Proof of Causa-
tion, 3 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 344, 349-54 (1977) (describing difficulty of proving traumatic
causation).
116. See Nesson, supra note 31, quoted in supra note 75.
117. King, supra note 59.
118. King, supra note 59, at 1363-64, 1378 n.85, 1381-87, 1394.
119. See King, supra note 59, at 1363-64, 1365 n.38, 1382-83, 1395-96.
120. See King, supra note 59, at 1383-85, 1385 n.107.
121. Three situations must be distinguished in this analysis: (1) the destruction of a 90% chance
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chances of survival from 95% to 5%, King would maintain that an actual loss of
a 90% chance of life had taken place before the life was lost;122 however, there is
no indication in his article that he would award damages at this point if the loss
of life is expected in the near future. Damages would be awarded if, and only if,
the death occurred. 123
To award damages after one knows the death will not occur is to award
damages for "negligence in the air." 124 King is right to avoid this result. Yet
his theory does not make sense conceptually if damages should be awarded for
the loss of a chance of a benefit, but are not awarded if the benefit is not lost.
Requiring the loss of the benefit itself is an indication that the real injury is not
the loss of the chance; it is the loss of the benefit.
The weakness of King's reasoning also is illustrated by his attempt to distin-
guish the chance of loss as damages to be valued from the chance that defendant
caused the loss:
To illustrate, assume that a patient suffering from cancer is killed
because a surgical instrument fails due to errors in the manufacturing
process. Assume that the chance that the patient would be cured of
cancer was only 30%. Under the approach proposed in this article,
the loss of that chance would be compensable. But if it did not appear
more likely than not that the defendant was the manufacturer of the
instrument, the plaintiff would ordinarily be denied recovery for that
loss. In other words, proof of a not-better-than-even chance that the
defendant caused the loss of the chance of a cure would not suffice. If,
however, the plaintiff proved that the defendant was probably the
source of the product and thus the cause of the loss, the plaintiff might
recover the value of the loss.125
The distinction drawn in this example between chance of loss as a detriment and
chance of loss as an element of causation is illusory. The chance that the patient
would have been cured without the surgical instrument failure is just as much a
chance of but for causation as the chance that defendant was the manufacturer
of the instrument. The 30% chance of cure with proper surgical instruments
implies a 70% chance that the patient would die from causes extraneous to the
defendant assuming the defendant is the manufacturer of the defective instru-
ment. The not-better-than-even chance that defendant was the manufacturer of
the defective instrument means a better-than-even chance that the patient would
die from causes extraneous to the defendant assuming the patient had a 100%
chance of cure otherwise. Both chances involve but for causation; only the for-
of life and the victim dies, (2) the destruction of a 90% chance of life and the victim does not die, and
(3) the destruction of a 90% chance of life and it is not known whether the victim will die or not.
King's theory only deals with the first and third situations.
122. King, supra note 59, at 1378 n.85.
123. The damages after the life was lost would not be 90% of the value of the life. Rather, the
loss would increase "because it would then be clear from the facts that the victim was not within the
[5%] chance of survival." Id. The actual loss would be 90/95 x value of the victim's life.
124. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 341, 162 N.E. 99, 99 (1928) (Justice Cardozo
quoting POLLOCK, ToRTS 455 (11 th ed.)).
125. King, supra note 59, at 1395 (footnote omitted).
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mer assumes defendant is in the wrong (as manufacturer of the defective instru-
ment) and the latter does not assume defendant is in the wrong.' 26
Suppose that the chance the patient would be cured was 100% and the
chance the defendant was the manufacturer of the instrument was 25%. That is,
defendant was one of four manufacturers who sold instruments to the hospital in
which the victim was treated, and all of the instruments were defective. If the
instrument used on the victim was to be selected at random from all the instru-
ments sold, was not the defendant depriving the victim of a 25% chance of cure
by selling defective instruments? If the victim already had a 75% chance of
being harmed from defective instruments other than those of the defendant, then
this chance was a preexisting condition and should be treated by King the same
as the preexisting condition in the example that decreases the chance of cure to
30%.
King's approach does flag the need for a proportional liability approach,
but it confuses causation questions with questions of valuation. His approach
does avoid a redefinition of causation as an element of tort, but it does so at the
expense of correct definition and understanding. Causation should be redefined
to allow for probable causation linked with proportional recovery if efficiency
and corrective justice are to be best achieved.
IV. OBSTACLES REMAINING IN THE PROOF OF A PROBABILITY
In the final analysis the problem that continues to haunt the supporters of a
proportional liability rule is the difficulty of accurately determining probabilities
of causation. This problem ordinarily does not exist under the preponderance of
the evidence standard, because the plaintiff needs only to show that causation is
more likely than not.127 Once the evidence is heard the factfinder may believe
without a doubt or with very little doubt that causation has occurred, or that
there is some chance (e.g., 80%) that causation has occurred, or that there is
some range of chance (e.g., 60%-90%) that causation has occurred.' 28 In each
126. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51 for a discussion of this distinction.
127. Beyond the problem of accuracy there is also the problem that the factfinder may not be
able to understand the proper way to interpret certain types of statistical evidence. See Saks & Kidd,
supra note 43, at 127-31 (demonstrating "the gap between the judgments people make intuitively and
the probabilities yielded by explicit calculation"). For a study of individuals' ability to understand
and use statistical information, see Faigman & Baglioni, Bayes' Theorem in the Trial Process: In-
structing Jurors on the Value of Statistical Evidence, 12 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 1 (1988) ("findings
lend support to previous research findings that identified individuals' reluctance to use statistical
information when making causal attributions"). For a brief summary of Bayes' Theorem which de-
scribes how different information should be integrated in determining a probability, see Tribe, supra
note 16, at 1350-54. Tribe, contrary to Saks and Kidd, believes that while mathematical methods
enhance the accuracy of probability calculations, the potential for misuse and misunderstanding
outweigh this benefit in the legal process. See id. at 1358-77 (discussing the costs of mathematical
models). Whether or not Tribe is correct, this problem of misunderstanding is not particular to a
system of proportional liability. If it exists, it is a problem in the present system as well.
128. It is the factfinder's belief and not merely the evidence that establishes the probability or
range of probability ofcausation. The dichotomy between belief and evidence on which that beliefis
based is expressed by Judge Jenkins in Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247 (D. Utah 1984),
rev'd, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 694 (1988):
[Sic long as the evidence will support an inference that defendant's conduct contributed to
the victim's injury, even though other inferences can be drawn that it did not, or that his
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of these cases the factfinder is permitted to find causation under the preponder-
ance of the evidence standard. Under a proportional liability rule, the factfinder
is permitted to find causation (100% liability) in the first case and probable cau-
sation (80% liability) in the second case. The third case presents a problem.
Because of insufficient information, no one probability can be established
unequivocally.
A recent study by Neil Cohen has elaborated on the fact that the less infor-
mation one has to determine the probability of an event, the greater the range of
uncertainty concerning that probability. Cohen explains that the probability de-
rived by a factfinder is based only on partial information; 129 therefore, it is only
an estimate of a true probability that would be based on an analysis of all possi-
ble information.130 It is a best guess (a point estimate) based on only a sampling
of the data. Given this fact, Cohen rejects the unwarranted assumption "that
the legal system can and does determine exact probabilities of the facts at is-
sue." 13 1 Some doubt of the true probability of causation always exists whenever
actual causation is uncertain. Depending on the available information, the
factfinder "only can state that he or she is certain to some degree, that the true
probability is within a particular interval, with that interval becoming wider as
the degree of certainty required of the factfinder increases." 132 In statistical
analysis, this gap of uncertainty is called a confidence interval.
Cohen suggests that the preponderance of the evidence standard requires
not only that the best estimate of the probability in question exceed the thresh-
old level of 50% but also that all probabilities within the confidence interval
exceed 50% as well. 13 3 Because the best estimate of the factfinder is always a
guess based on partial information, it is more accurate to provide a range of
values, a confidence interval around this guess, so that one can say with a partic-
ular level of confidence that it contains the true probability of causation. Under
Cohen's proposal, to meet the preponderance of the evidence standard this range
injury was due to other causes, "it is for the finder of fact"-this court--"to draw the most
appropriate inference using the court's own best judgment, experience and common sense
in light of all the circumstances."
Id. at 413 (footnote omitted); see Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L.
REV. 543, 560 (1962).
129. Cohen, Confidence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a World of Imperfect Knowl-
edge, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 385, 397-98 (1985) [hereinafter Cohen, Confidence], criticized in Kaye,
Apples and Oranges: Confidence Coefficients and the Burden of Persuasion, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 54
(1987) (with a response in Cohen, Conceptualizing Proof and Calculating Probabilities: A Response
to Professor Kaye, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 78 (1987) [hereinafter Cohen, Conceptualizing Proo).
130. Cohen, Confidence, supra note 129, at 398. Presumably, if all possible information were
known, the probability of causation would be 0% or 100%. A true probability between these ex-
tremes could be reached, however, if "all possible information" were read to exclude the event of
causation itself.
131. Cohen, Confidence, supra note 129, at 394.
132. Cohen, Confidence, supra note 129, at 399. Mark Kelman has pointed out that belief in the
probability of causation may be "with radically different degrees of confidence" based on "radically
different levels of 'knowledge'." Kelman, supra note 3, at 620. The determination of what the level
of confidence should be is beyond the scope of this Article. For a discussion of the value of different
levels, see Cohen, Confidence, supra note 129, at 409-17; Cohen, Conceptualizing Proof, supra note
129, at 91-95; Kaye, supra note 129, at 64-73.
133. Cohen, Confidence, supra note 129, at 399, 406.
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of values should be greater than 50%. Thus, in cases where little information is
provided and the confidence interval is quite wide, a best estimate above 50%
may be insufficient to satisfy the standard because the confidence interval in-
cludes values below 50%.134
While Cohen focusses on the preponderance of the evidence standard, his
discussion of confidence intervals may be extended to a proportional liability
rule. In the same way that the lowest point within a confidence interval should
be greater than 50% to satisfy the preponderance of the evidence standard, it
should be greater than the probability chosen to assess liability under a propor-
tional liability rule. The plaintiff has the burden of proof. If the factfinder be-
lieves that the true probability of causation lies somewhere between 60% and
90%, then the probability of causation may be established by the factfinder at
60%. The plaintiff has not been able to convince the factfinder that the true
probability of causation lies above 60%. It may be 60% itself. Thus even with
insufficient information to establish one probability in the factfinder's mind, the
lowest probability on a range of possible probabilities is sufficient to establish the
proportion of damages for which the defendant is held liable.
V. PROPORTIONAL LIABILITY IN OTHER AREAS OF LAW
A. Joint Causation
Although proportional liability has not been advocated as a comprehensive
rule when causation itself is uncertain, it has played a role in apportioning dam-
ages between defendants who have combined to produce a harm. The wrongful
acts of two or more defendants may combine to produce harm to the plaintiff,135
or the plaintiff's own negligence may combine with that of one or more defend-
ants to produce harm. 136 While harm and its cause are certain, the extent of the
harm by each of the actors may be uncertain. In such cases uncertainty is an
obstacle to the apportionment of damages among the actors, but the movement
in the law has been toward apportionment rather than away from it.
Until recently a majority of courts refused to permit contribution among
independent tortfeasors joined in a single action when their negligence contrib-
uted to a single result. t37 Most states now permit contribution. Some require
apportionment by pro rata shares and others in proportion to the comparative
fault of the defendants. 138 Emphasis has been placed increasingly on the latter
134. Cohen argues that in a case such as Smith, see supra text accompanying notes 39-43, the
point estimate of the probability of liability is greater than 50%, but because of the lack of sufficient
information the confidence interval straddles 50%. Cohen, Confidence, supra note 129, at 406-07.
135. An example is when the plaintiff is injured by the collision of two vehicles.
136. An example is when the plaintiff is injured by the collision of her vehicle with that of
defendant.
137. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, at 337; see Rizzo & Arnold, supra note 3, at 1400-02 (a
quick history that emphasizes that the common law nevertheless permitted apportionment through
independent contribution suits).
138. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, at 338-41; see also Landes & Posner, Joint and Multiple




approach in recent years as both case law and statutes have limited the scope of
joint and several liability and provided for proportionate liability in certain
circumstances. 139
For example, in Prudential Life Ins. Co. v. Moody,14° the Kentucky
Supreme Court interpreted a state statute to limit damages against a defendant
to the proportion of its liability as determined by the jury. The jury had appor-
tioned liability in the amount of 50% to each of two defendants, but one of the
defendants was dismissed on the basis of a five-year statute of limitations. The
court found that the plaintiff would still be entitled to only 50% of the damages
from the other defendant rather than the full award.
The same kind of problem arises when a defendant's tort combines with an
innocent cause to produce a harm that exceeds the harm that would otherwise
have been caused by defendant's tort. The defendant is usually held liable only
for that part of the harm attributable to his negligence even though exact deter-
mination of that part is impossible. 14 1 Thus, in the same way that uncertain
contribution to harm is resolved with a proportional damages approach, uncer-
tain causation itself may be resolved.
When uncertainty complicates the determination of a defendant's contribu-
tion to the harm, the extent of the harm is usually left to a factfinder's estimate
despite the lack of definite and satisfactory proof. 14 2 In Hughes v. Great Ameri-
can Indemnity Co. 143 defendant's insured drove into a car that had just been
involved in an accident. Plaintiff sought damages from defendant for the whole
of the harm suffered in both accidents, arguing "that it would be impossible
under circumstances such as those prevailing in this case to make proof which
would segregate the injuries attributable to the separate blows."' 14 4 The court
disagreed and upheld the right of the jury to award partial damages based on the
extent to which the plaintiff was injured by the defendant. 145 The court decided
that the part of the damages caused by the second collision "do[es] not have to
be established with mathematical certainty so long as there is evidence that dam-
ages did probably ensue from the second collision and so long as a reasonable
basis is established for recovery of those damages."' 146 Likewise, uncertainty in
the determination of a probability figure need not bar use of the proportional
liability rule.
139. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, at 56-57 (1988 Supp.). For an argument that apportion-
ment should be made on the basis of relative causation instead of relative fault, see Rizzo & Arnold,
supra note 3, at 1400-02.
140. 696 S.W.2d 503 (Ky. 1985). See Howell v. River Products Co., 379 N.W.2d 919 (Iowa
1986), and other cases cited in PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, at 348.
141. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, at 349.
142. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, at 348-50.
143. 236 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1956).
144. Id. at 75.
145. Id. at 74.
146. Id. at 75.
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B. Comparative Negligence
Besides the apportionment of liability among two or more defendants who
have harmed the plaintiff, there is also apportionment between plaintiff and de-
fendant who are both at fault in causing harm to the plaintiff. In most states the
all-or-nothing rule of contributory negligence has given way in recent years to
the notion of comparative fault, which resulted in the approval of the Uniform
Comparative Fault Act by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws in 1977.147 Although one of the chief objections to this doc-
trine is the general inability of the law to "measure how much the damage
suffered is attributable to the plaintiff's own fault," 14 8 it has also been adopted
in admiralty law as the best approach in an imperfect world. Thus, in United
States v. Reliable Transfer Co.,149 a case in which a ship ran aground, the court
stated:
The divided damages rule has been said to be justified by the difficulty
of determining comparative degrees of negligence when both parties
are concededly guilty of contributing fault.... Although there is some
force in this argument, it cannot justify an equal division of damages in
every case of collision based on mutual fault. When it is impossible
fairly to allocate degrees of fault, the division of damages equally be-
tween wrongdoing parties is an equitable solution. But the rule is un-
necessarily crude and inequitable in a case like this one where an
allocation of disparate proportional fault has been made. Potential
problems of proof in some cases hardly require adherence to an archaic
and unfair rule in all cases. Every other major maritime nation has
evidently been able to apply a rule of comparative negligence without
serious problems.150
In Brisboy v. Fibreboard Corp. 151 the court permitted a jury's finding that a
heavy smoker who worked with asbestos was 55% responsible for his own death
under Michigan's comparative negligence law. It stated that the risk of develop-
ing lung cancer was within the scope of the risk assumed by the smoker and
rejected the claim that there was no rational basis for the jury's apportionment
of fault.' 52 The attempt in these cases is clearly to determine proportions on the
basis of the best, albeit imperfect, evidence available.
C. Damages
Another area of uncertainty lies in the degree of harm itself. When a con-
tract has been breached, a defendant may lose earnings or profits that cannot be
147. See 12 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 37 (1988 Pocket Part). Most states have adopted
comparative negligence in some form. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, at 471 n.30 (1988
Supp.) (indicating that only six states and the District of Columbia still have contributory
negligence).
148. Heil v. Glanding, 42 Pa. 493, 499 (1862).
149. 421 U.S. 397 (1975).
150. Id. at 407.
151. 429 Mich. 540, 418 N.W.2d 650 (1988).
152. Id. at 552, 418 N.W.2d at 655.
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determined with exactitude. Any of a number of events may affect the earnings
or profits that defendant would have received had the contract not been
breached. When a tort has altered the course of events for the plaintiff, whether
and to what extent that course of events would have resulted in a benefit or harm
to the plaintiff may be uncertain. Nevertheless, the courts have shown little
hesitation in charging a defendant with expected damages despite the uncer-
tainty of the harm caused.' 53 Courts' ability to award damages even when the
harm caused is uncertain further illustrates that they could apportion damages
when the causation of that harm is also uncertain.
In Rideaux v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Company, Inc. 154 a widow filed suit to
recover damages for the death of her husband, who was crushed to death under
the fall of heavy steel beams caused by the negligence of defendant. Defendant
admitted its liability but challenged the amount of damages claimed. The court
held that the correct measure of damages "should be equivalent to actual com-
pensation for the deprivation of the reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefits
that would have inured to Libelant for continued life as under the evidence
could be expected of her husband." 155 The court then determined damages by
considering several factors, including age, health, habits, capacities, disposition,
and life and work expectancies of the deceased husband.' 56 The uncertainty in
determining damages based on these factors did not deter the court.
Uncertainty in the determination of damages was also an issue in the breach
of a requirements contract in Locke v. United States.' 57 The court held that
recovery would be allowed if a "reasonable probability" of damage could be
established, even using "improbable and inferential as well as direct and positive
proof."' 58 The court reasoned that "'[a]ny other rule would enable the wrong-
doer to profit by his wrongdoing.' "159
The use of probabilities to determine damages in the case of uncertain harm
is even more clearly illustrated by the lost-chance cases in contests.' 60 In Mange
v. Unicorn Press '6' the plaintiffs sought damages for an alleged breach of rules
by the defendant in a Puzzle-Quiz contest. Although there were 23,548 contes-
tants among whom only 210 prizes were awarded, the court followed the ration-
ale "that plaintiff's chances of success would have had some market value
especially since there was no risk of out-of-pocket loss offsetting the possibility of
gain."1 62
Uncertainty may also exist when defendant's tortious conduct has dimin-
153. Ball, supra note 35, at 814.
154. 285 F. Supp. 153 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
155. Id. at 156.
156. Id. at 156-57.
157. 283 F.2d 521 (CI. Ct. 1960).
158. Id. at 524.
159. Id. (quoting Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946)).
160. See Chaplin v. Hicks, 2 K.B. 786 (1911); MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAM-
AGES 117-26 (1935); Comment, Damages Contingent Upon Chance, 18 RUTGERs L. REV. 875
(1964).
161. 129 F. Supp. 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
162. Id. at 730.
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ished or destroyed a chance of benefit that already has been diminished by other
causes. In Steinhauser v. Hertz Corp. 163 plaintiff suffered schizophrenia follow-
ing an automobile accident. The court found that although the accident might
be found by a jury to be the precipitating cause of the schizophrenia, the defend-
ants would be entitled "to explore the probability that the child might have de-
veloped schizophrenia in any event" in order to decrease the damages that
would otherwise be owed. 164 The existence of a greater than usual chance that
plaintiff would have developed schizophrenia in the absence of the accident
would allow an appropriate discount to be made for the harm suffered by plain-
tiff, even though the future apart from the accident was difficult to predict.165
The treatment of uncertainty in degree of harm informs the treatment of
uncertainty in causation. Uncertainty in degree of harm raises the question of
how much harm an act has caused. Causal uncertainty raises the question of
whether an act actually has caused harm. If courts are willing to calculate the
expectations of degree of harm when degree of harm is uncertain, it should be
willing to calculate the expectation of causation when causation is uncertain.
VI. CONCLUSION
The proportional liability rule offers a fairer, more efficient remedy than the
preponderance of the evidence standard in cases of uncertain causation. Both
the commentators and the courts are moving in the direction of adopting this
rule, but no judge or commentator has taken the final step. The explanation for
this hesitancy may be that the rule replaces causation with probable causation as
an element in tort. 16 6 Contrary to those who believe that this replacement elides
cause from the tort analysis, however, this approach deepens the notion of cause
by considering its probability. Causation provides the link between the defend-
ant's wrongdoing and the plaintiff's harm. When that link is believed by a
factfinder to be probable rather than actual, the willingness to consider this
163. 421 F.2d 1169 (2d Cir. 1970).
164. Id. at 1173.
165. Id. at 1173-74; see Lancaster v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 773 F.2d 807, 822 (7th Cir. 1985)
(corollary to thin skull rule is that damages must be reduced to reflect the likelihood that plaintiff
would have been injured anyway), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 945 (1987); Abernathy v. Superior Hard-
woods, Inc., 704 F.2d 963, 973 (7th Cir. 1983) (in calculating damages in an eggshell skull case, the
trier of fact must make an adjustment for the possibility that the preexisting condition would have
resulted in harm to the plaintiff even if there had been no tort); Dillon v. Twin State Gas & Elec. Co.,
85 N.H. 449, 457, 163 A. 111, 115 (1932) (although the electric current caused the death, the fact
that the victim had lost his balance and started to fall should be considered when determining dam-
ages); McCahill v. New York Transp. Co., 201 N.Y. 221,224, 94 N.E. 616, 617 (1911) (where injury
precipitated attack of delirium tremens, "lilt is easily seen that the probability of later death from
existing causes for which a defendant was not responsible would probably be an important clement
in fixing damages, but it is not a defense"). In Schore v. Mueller, 290 Minn. 186, 189, 186 N.W.2d
699, 701 (1971), the court stated:
[A] person who has a preexisting disability is entitled to recover damages for an aggrava-
tion of that condition even though the particular consequences would not have followed
absent his prior disability, recovery being limited ... to the additional injury over and
above the consequences which normally would have followed from the preexisting condi-
tion absent defendant's negligence.
166. See Thomson, The Decline of Cause, 76 GEo. L.J. 137 (1987) (discussing moral and legal
aspects of causation and fault).
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probability and allocate proportional relief reflects a more complete and accu-
rate notion of cause.
Proportional liability is already used in a distorted form in many cases that
never reach trial. Settlements are negotiated on the chances of winning, and
settlement figures take into account not only the extent of loss to the plaintiff but
also the probability that defendant's causation of that loss will be proved in
court. The distortion to proportional liability lies in determining the chances of
proving but for causation by a preponderance of the evidence. With propor-
tional liability the determination of the probability of causation by the defendant
is made directly.1 67
The substantial possibility test recognizes the inadequacy of the present pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard, but it fails to provide an adequate solution.
The Sindell line of cases has introduced the concept of proportional liability, but
the concept has not yet advanced beyond the areas of mass torts. With the
modem advances in probability theory, the time has come to adopt a propor-
tional liability rule. Such a rule would deter inefficient behavior and properly
compensate the parties. In addition, it would follow strong parallel development
in the areas of joint causation, comparative negligence, and uncertainty as to
harm caused. Judges who have twisted to find justice in the rigid interstices of
the present standard would suddenly be freed to provide justice in a more direct
manner under the new rule.
167. See Coons, Approaches to Court Imposed Compromise-The Uses of Doubt and Reason, 58
Nw. U.L. REv. 750, 751 (1964). Professor Coons states:
The judicial power to compromise between the often harsh alternatives of all-or-noth-
ing has received little consideration as a special problem in our jurisprudence. Its neglect is
peculiar in the light of the high incidence of compromise through private settlement-a
procedure of peacemaking in which the judge has taken an increasingly active role as medi-
ator. Judicial activism in chambers is matched only by judicial paralysis on the bench.
The "fair" decision promoted in private is one unattainable by law. That which the judge
thinks just he cannot order. That which in chambers he calls "unjust" he orders and
defends with thirty pages of rhetoric. Strange law? Passing strange I'd say-at least it
might seem so to a Lunar visitor who shared our logic but not our legal experience.
Id. Professor Gold notes:
Mixtures of liability and damages issues are generally contrary to doctrine, yet it is likely
that juries conduct such analyses all the time. In a mock jury study, juries facing ambigu-
ous liability issues returned plaintiffs' verdicts averaging about 20% lower than juries hear-
ing the same case with clearer evidence of liability, even though the damage evidence was
the same. Such "compromise verdict[s]," "where the jury, in doubt as to [liability,] ...
brings in a verdict for the plaintiff but in a smaller amount that [sic] it would have if these
questions had been free from doubt" are believed to occur frequently. Some courts have
accepted the inevitability, and even good sense, of liability-damages tradeoffs.
Gold, supra note 37, at 399-400 n. 118 (citations omitted).
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